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GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
1.1.  BACKGROUND  
 
Henson S and Loader R, identify that ‘one of the most important manifestations of economic 
globalization is the expansion of international trade’.1 It also noteworthy that while some 
other countries have been successfully integrated into the world markets namely developed 
countries, most developing countries have struggled and still struggle to ‘become fully 
integrated into the world trading system’. 2  In this respect there has been a determined effort 
to liberalize world trade. Some of these efforts can be traced in the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) successive Rounds- negotiations and the subsequent establishment 
of the WTO (1995), which was intended to ‘create opportunities for developing countries to 
access the markets of developed countries’ 3 with minimal trade distortions.  
In particular the Uruguay Round (UR) attempted to reduce barriers to trade in agricultural 
and food products thus, providing opportunities for enhanced export performance.4 These 
commitments to liberalize trade were taken over by the Doha Round in relation to market 
access as well as the Bali Round. However, ‘concurrent with the liberalization of tariff and 
quantitative restrictions there has been increased concern pertaining to the impact of other 
measures on agricultural and food exports’ in the form of non-tariff measures (NTMs) or 
non-tariff barriers (NTBs).5 Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) measures constitute one of 
these NTBs. In this respect Michalopolous C, points out that ‘it is now widely acknowledged 
that technical measures such as food quality and (SPS) measures impede trade particularly in 
the case of developing countries’.6 The WTO Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary (SPS) Agreement 
‘adopted in the 1994 UR lays down a common basis with respect to SPS measures for all 
WTO Member countries’.7 According to Annex 1A of the SPS Agreement, SPS measures are 
                                                          
1 S Henson & R Loader ‘Barriers to agricultural exports from developing countries: The role of sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Requirements’ (2001) 29 World Development 85, 87. 
2 Ibid, 85.  
3 Ibid.  
4 These barriers included tariffs, quantitative restrictions and related trade barriers and formed the primary target 
of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture (AoA). 
5 See (note 2 above) 
6 This is the case ‘independent of whether the countries in question are additionally a member of a Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA) or not’ see C Michalopolous ‘The developing countries in the WTO’. (1999) 27 World 
Development 117, 136. 
7 B Rudloff. & J Simons ‘Comparing EU free trade agreements: Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards’ 2004 6B 
Maastricht In Brief 1, 1. 
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defined as ‘all types of trade rules aimed at the protection of human, animal and plant life or 
health’.8  
The aforegoing emphasizes that the SPS Agreement, negotiated under the auspices of the  
UR, is intended to enable Member countries to protect their human, animal and plant life or 
health. According to Mustafizur R, ‘the spirit of the particular Agreement is to ensure this 
objective without making any discriminatory trade-restrictions’.9 However, despite the 
impression that, SPS measures provide WTO Member countries with ‘an opportunity to 
safeguard their interest in crucial areas of health and hygiene, there is a growing 
apprehension in developing countries that there are certain provisions in the SPS Agreement 
which act as border protection instruments’.10 Another concern advanced by Michalopolous 
C is that developing countries lack the requisite resources to effectively participate in the 
WTO institutions thus impeding on their ability to exploit the opportunities provided by the 
SPS Agreements for example.11 
SPS measures are considered to be the most significant impediment to agricultural and food 
exports to a number of developed countries’ markets.12 The particular focus of this thesis will 
be to critically assess the SPS measures and the extent to which they affect the ability of 
developing countries to access developed countries’ markets in particular the European 
Union (EU). This is of particular interest to this thesis as studies suggest that the market for 
which SPS requirements were considered to be the most significant impediment to trade was 
the EU.13  The commitment to market access received more attention under the UR which 
produced the first multilateral agreement namely the WTO Agreement on Agriculture 
dedicated to agricultural trade14. Market access forms one of the core areas of focus and 
commitments of the AoA.15 In particular the Agreement provides for the tarrification on 
(NTMs) affecting agricultural trade and the reduction of these and prevailing tariffs.16 Market 
access which will form part of the core discussion of this thesis is extensively discussed 
                                                          
8 WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 1994 ANNEX 1A (a)-(d) 
9 R Mustafizur ‘EU Ban on Shrimp Imports from Bangladesh: A Case Study on Market Access Problems Faced 
by the LDCs’ (2005). Consumer Unity & Trust Society (CUTS). 
10 Ibid  
11 Michalopolous (note 5 above) 136 
12Henson & Loader (note 1 above) 91 
13 Ibid  
14 WTO ‘Understanding the WTO’ Available at www.wto.org at 23 ACCESSED ON 27 MARCH 2014 
15 WTO Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) 1994 Art 4 and preamble which outlines the commitment of the AoA 
to ‘achieving specific binding commitments in each of the following areas: market access; domestic 
support; export competition; and to reaching an agreement on sanitary and phytosanitary issues…’ 
16 DE Hathaway & MD Ignco ‘Agricultural liberalization and the Uruguay Round’ W Martin & L .A Winters In 
(Eds) The Uruguay Round and the developing countries. (1996) 30, 30 
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under the current World Trade Organisation (WTO) Doha Development Agenda Round 
(DDA). To highlight the growing importance of market access, it can be noted that ‘since the 
launch of the Doha Development Agenda at the November 2001 Ministerial Meeting, market 
access issues on exports of particular interest to developing countries have been given greater 
prominence’. 17 
In relation to the AoA mentioned above there were concerns that the ‘incremental benefits of 
liberalisation of trade under this Agreement could, in effect, be undermined by protectionist 
use of SPS measures’.18 It could also be argued that protectionist uses ‘may not necessarily be 
aimed at safeguarding the interest of domestic industries only, but the interests of favoured 
trading partners and developed country entrepreneurs investing abroad as well’.19 It should 
also be noted that this is in contravention with the WTO underlying multilateral trading 
principle against discrimination and more particularly the ‘Most Favoured Nation’20 
treatment hereinafter referred to as the MFN treatment principle. This principle entails that 
countries cannot discriminate between their trading partners and should accord the same 
treatment for all of its trading partners save where exceptions such as ‘preferential or special 
treatment’ apply.21  
Furthermore, the issue of SPS measures becomes very problematic considering that one of 
the commitments underpinning the WTO is to contribute to the institution’s objectives by 
encouraging members to ‘enter into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements’.22 
Such arrangements are directed at substantially reducing tariffs and other barriers to trade 
amongst other commitments. The interest of this thesis in this area of International Trade 
Law is derived from such a background as provided above. In this respect the impact of SPS 
measures on developing countries’ (South Africa and Kenya) ability to access the developed 
countries’ markets will be assessed in this thesis. The point of departure is tracing the 
development of trade from the GATT (1947) past the GATT Rounds, GATT 1994, the 
Uruguay Round, WTO (1995) until the Doha Round negotiations and the Bali Round. 
 
                                                          
17 R Sandrey, L Smit, T Fundira& H Edinger ‘Non-tariff measures inhibiting South African exports to China 
and India’ Tralac Working Paper No 6/2008 Available at http://www.tralac.org ACCESSED ON 1 APRIL 2014 
18 Mustafizur (note 8 above) 
19 Ibid  
20Article I General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994 
21 Ibid Art XXIV 





This thesis is motivated by the need to address the growing problem of SPS measures and the 
detrimental effect they pose on developing countries’ market access. It should be emphasized 
that if the underlying commitment of the WTO and its predecessors to liberalize trade is to be 
sustained; all forms of measures that impede trade for developing countries in respect of 
market access should be eliminated. Whereas the successive Rounds of the GATT 
negotiations and the establishment of the WTO (1995), have created opportunities for 
developing countries to access the markets of developed countries without difficulties23 this 
progress is being threatened by the proliferation of NTBs. Of these NTBs, SPS measures (as 
highlighted earlier) are the central focus of this thesis and in particular their potential use by 
developed countries as a protectionist tool24. The susceptibility of the SPS measures to be 
misused as a protectionist tool can be contributed to the assertion that some of the SPS 
Agreement’s provisions are a ‘best endeavour provisions’ and thus not mandatory. 25 These 
provisions will be critically analysed later in the thesis. 
Pursuant to the rationale highlighted above, this thesis targets to deal with the problems 
associated with SPS measures in relation to market access of developing countries. It is 
explicit in the SPS Agreement that the Agreement should assist to facilitate trade.26 In terms 
of Article 10 of the Agreement ‘developed countries should take account of the special needs 
of developing countries in the preparation and application of SPS measures’. It follows that if 
the acknowledgement of the special needs of the developing countries is adhered to, this 
would facilitate trade.27 
In respect of the issue of market access, Noor H points out that ‘evidence shows that 
developing countries have comparative advantage in the production of agricultural and food 
products’. 28 In respect of this, market access is of great importance if developing countries 
are to successfully exploit opportunities for-high value added food exports to developed 
                                                          
23 Henson & Loader (note 1 above) 85 
24Australian SPS Capacity Building Program ‘The WTO SPS Agreement’ at 5 Available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2013%20SPS.pdf ACCESSED ON 03 APRIL 2014 
25H Noor ‘Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures and their Impact on Kenya’ (2000) EconNews Africa 1, 12- 
Article 10 of the SPS Agreement is one such example. The S & D provisions contemplated in the article are not 
mandatory.  
26 Ibid  
27 Ibid  
28 Ibid 11 
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countries.29 However, market access with the same capacity as the one contemplated above 
cannot be possible if the effects of SPS measures in respect of market access are not dealt 
with. This emphasises the need to implement SPS measures particularly those of developed 
countries in line with the underlying commitments of the SPS Agreement itself. Such 
commitments include the objective of extending special treatment to developing countries as 
highlighted in the preamble of the WTO and Article 10 of the SPS Agreement.  
It is also important to note that amongst the WTO’s cardinal principles, are the commitments 
to promote fair competition and open trade as well as enhancing freer trade and predictability 
in trade.30 It follows that if SPS measures are not regulated and remain susceptible to 
manipulation by developed countries, the talk of fair competition will be merely lip service 
by the developed countries. The same applies to open and freer trade which presuppose ideal 
market access. In the same respect, the thesis’ argument is that predictability in trade can only 
be effectively possible if the SPS measures are regulated fairly taking into consideration the 
needs of developing countries. This thesis will show the negative effects of SPS measures on 
market access generally and from the perspective of developing countries as well. This 
approach serves to show the need to eliminate the effects of SPS measures on the ability of 
developing countries to access the markets of developed countries without difficulties.31 
It is against the arguments highlighted above that thesis is written and relevant in this area of 
International Trade Law. 
 
1.3. PURPOSE STATEMENT (AIMS AND OBJECTIVES)  
 
The purpose of this thesis is to assess the impact of SPS measures on the ability of 
developing countries to access the markets of developed countries. In this respect the thesis 
has the following aims and objectives: 
1. To trace how the development needs of developing countries have been dealt with in the 
MTS. 
2. To understand the nature of non- tariff barriers, more specifically SPS measures and their 
effects on market access from the perspective of developing countries. 
                                                          
29 Ibid  
30See (note 14 above) 13 ACCESSED ON 02 APRIL 2014 
31Henson & Loader (note 1 above) 85 
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3. To highlight the problems that have been suffered or are likely to be suffered by 
developing countries due to the current implementation of SPS measures by developed 
countries. 
4. To subsequently recommend how these problems and concerns raised can be dealt with.  
It should be noted that the assessment of the effects of SPS measures on market access of 
developing countries will be achieved based on the case studies of South Africa and Kenya 
and their trading relationships with the European Union. 
1.4. RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
 
Pursuant to the main focus of the thesis namely, assessing the impact of SPS measures on the 
ability of developing countries to access the markets of developed countries, these are the 
following research questions: 
1. To what extent has the Multilateral Trading System (MTS) addressed the 
development needs of developing countries? 
2. To what extent do SPS measures impede trade between developing and developed 
countries? 
3. To what extent has the SPS Agreement been effective in enhancing market access 
for developing countries? 
4. How have the EU SPS measures impeded market access for South Africa and 
Kenya? 
 
1.5. LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
A focus on SPS measures indicates that there is extensive literature on this area in general.  
The WTO World Trade Report 2012, for instance, focuses on the trade effects of non-tariff 
measures in general.32 In the report, where SPS measures are analysed, they are discussed 
alongside domestic regulation in services in order to examine whether ‘regulatory 
harmonization and/or mutual recognition help to reduce the trade-hindering effects caused by 
                                                          




the diversity of TBT/SPS measures and domestic regulation in services’.33 Most of the 
authors have extensively written on the effects of SPS measures on the ability of developing 
countries to trade. More specifically they have written on how these measures can impede 
trade or be used as a protectionist by some developed countries.34 The general consensus 
however, seems to be that as ‘traditional trade barriers such as tariff and quantitative 
restrictions continue to decline, protectionist interests are likely to prompt the increasing use 
of food safety regulations and other technical barriers to block trade’.35 As highlighted earlier 
these are called NTBs or NTMs and they can constitute trade barriers as effective as 
traditional tariffs.36  
It is also important to analyse the effects of SPS measures specifically in relation to market 
access of developing countries to developed countries’ markets. Such literature would be 
very crucial in the sense that market access is a by-product of ‘trade liberalization’. As such if 
a measure of any sort limits market access it would be contrary to the building mandate of 
WTO to promote trade via elimination of trade barriers of any sort. In this respect considering 
the crucial importance of market access in international trade would allow recommendations 
to be made in respect of how SPS measures can be harmonized and regulated so as to 
improve market access. Moreover, much of the literature on this area is written from an 
economic perspective. This thesis attempts to show how this problem can be addressed from 
a legal perspective taking into the consideration the relevant legal framework. 
Athukorala P and Jayasuriya S in their paper, in addressing the issue SPS measures, point out 
that ‘processed food exports to developed country markets have emerged as a potentially 
major new source of dynamic export growth for many developing countries in the recent 
years’.37 They correctly identify that this opportunity is heavily limited as ‘exploiting it 
(opportunity/potential) poses many challenges’.38 It can be argued that the reason for this 
setback is that the capacity of developing countries to penetrate developed countries’ markets 
critically depends on their ability to meet increasingly more stringent food safety standards 
imposed by developed countries. They further argue that this situation leads to 
                                                          
33 Ibid 143 
34 Australian SPS Capacity Building Program (note 22 above) 5 ACCESSED ON 03 APRIL 2014 
35 P Athukorala & S Jayasuriya ‘Food Safety Issues, Trade and WTO Rules: A Developing Country Perspective’ 
2003 The World Economy 1, 1 
36T Josling & D Roberts ‘Measuring the Impact of SPS Standards on Market Access’ 2011 at 1 Available at 
www.agritrade.org/Publications/documents/MarketAccess.pdf ACCESSED 10 July  2014 




unpredictability in terms of trade. As such this raises suspicions that SPS measures are being 
used as ‘a non-transparent, trade impeding protectionist tool’39, rather than as a legitimate 
instrument for the protection of human, plant and animal health. The purpose of the authors’ 
paper is to review the key issues related to the trade effects of food safety standards. The 
context of the paper however points to the ‘strengthening of global trade architecture for 
development’.40 As such these authors write from an economic and development perspective. 
This thesis critically analyses the issue of SPS measures and their impact on market access in 
relation to developing countries from a legal perspective. 
In respect of the above Mutume G notes that while the SPS Agreement aims to protect the 
health of citizens within states, it ‘also provides a loophole that allows countries to introduce 
measures that result in higher levels of protection than the international norm’. 41He further 
argues that whereas high tariffs remain a significant barrier, NTBs, such as ‘arbitrarily 
imposed SPS rules’, further limit goods exported to the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD).42 It can be gathered from these concerns that the 
SPS measures favour the developed countries to the disadvantage of the developing countries 
which lack adequate resources to meet or implement these SPS measures. This argument 
finds favour with Finger J and Schuler P who argue that most developed countries lack a 
‘sense of ownership’ 43 in relation to the SPS Agreement rules and procedures. They further 
argue that the rules and procedures underpinning this Agreement were imposed by developed 
countries that are perceived to have dominated the UR negotiations.44 
Other authors namely Josling T & Roberts D engage in the problem of SPS measures by 
‘measuring the impact of SPS standards on market access’.45 The problem associated with 
their approach is that it is purely economic. As such it does not reveal how the current legal 
framework governing and regulating use of SPS measures can address the negative effects of 
these measures on market access. The closest there is to what this thesis will focus on is the 
work of Henson S and Loader R who assess the impact of SPS measures on the ability of 
                                                          
39Ibid, 1396. 
40Ibid.  
41Gumisai Mutume ‘New barriers hinder African Trade’ (2006) Africa Renewal Available at 
http://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/january-2006/new-barriers-hinder-african-trade ACCESSED ON 
31 MARCH 2014 
42Ibid.  
43 J.M Finger & P Schuler ‘Implementation of the Uruguay Round Commitments: The Development Challenge’ 
Paper presented at the conference Developing Countries in a Millennium Round (1999) Geneva September. 
44Ibid.  
45 Josling & Roberts (note 36 above).  
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developing countries to access markets of developed countries for agricultural and food 
products in particular the EU.46 However, their work is highly empirical and also fails to 
focus on how the WTO legal instruments can be used to deal with the problem of SPS 
measures. The WTO Report points out that ‘SPS measures have positive trade effects for 
more technologically advanced sectors but negative effects for the agricultural sector’.47 
However, the report is not specific as to the issue that ‘agricultural and food exports are of 
particular importance for many developing countries’.48 As such their focus on the effects of 
SPS measures on the developing countries and market access for these countries is limited.  
In this respect this thesis has its focus on the issue of SPS measures and their effects on 
market access in relation to developing countries. More particularly the thesis shows how the 
current WTO legal framework governing trade as well the foundational principles of the 
MTS can be invoked to deal with the problem in question. 
1.6. CONCEPTUAL OR THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
This thesis will adopt a legal theoretical framework. The purpose of this approach is to 
premise the research in a legal context namely under the realm of International Trade Law. 
Thus in assessing the impact of the SPS measures on market access of developing countries, 
this exercise will be undertaken using legal lenses.  
1.7. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
This thesis will make extensive use of qualitative methods of research in pursuit of the 
aforementioned research objectives. It will be purely desktop research. This is the case 
because much of the issues related to SPS measures are found in codified legal instruments 
and this thesis will be conducted by referring to the already existent literature. Reference will 
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HISTORY OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE MULTILATERAL TRADING 




It is evident that international trade has ‘increased over the past century and that it has grown 
consistently and more rapidly than world economic output’.49 This historically unprecedented 
expansion of international trade since World War II is largely accredited to the multilateral 
trade system (MTS).50 According to Hoekman B, the genesis of the MTS was the ‘interwar 
experience of the beggar-thy-neighbour protectionism and capital controls put in place by 
governments’.51 The purpose of these protectionist measures by governments was to 
stimulate domestic economic activity and employment.52 In 1947, General Agreements on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 1947 created a ‘new basic template of rules and exceptions to 
regulate international trade between contracting parties’ (CPs).53 
The MTS itself is both ‘a political process and a set of political institutions’.54 Moreover, the 
MTS can also be defined as a set of legal institutions. In support of this Birkbeck C asserts 
that, law is central to the World Trading Organisation (WTO) which is an MTS institution.55 
Furthermore the core purpose of the WTO is to ‘protect a stable, multilateral, rules-based 
approach to international trade’.56 The MTS’ ‘political process’ aspect is based on 
negotiations between States.57 It is through this bargaining and negotiating process that 
governments create trade rules to govern their behaviour towards each other and open their 
markets to each other’s exports.58 The political institutions and legal institutions ‘initially the 
GATT and now the WTO provide the rules of the game, facilitate trade negotiations, and 
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more generally promote international trade cooperation’.59 One reason why trade has 
expanded so rapidly since World War II is largely because governments have used the MTS 
to progressively eliminate national barriers to international trade. Such progressive efforts can 
be traced in the formation of the GATT and its successive Rounds and finally the WTO and 
their concerted efforts to liberalize trade.60  
One of the important questions that ought to be dealt with is the extent to which the MTS has 
addressed the development needs of developing countries. However, before critically 
assessing the extent to which the MTS has addressed the needs in question, it is of great 
importance to understand what the multilateral trade system is, the principles underlying it 
and its modus operandi.61 Furthermore, it is vital to have an understanding of why the MTS 
exists and the purpose it serves in International Trade. These questions will be further 
discussed in this chapter.   
2.1.2 The Multilateral Trading System (MTS)  
 
As mentioned previously, the MTS is an international political system and international trade 
institutions stand at its centre.62 One of these international trade institutions is the GATT 
which was the principle international trade ‘institution’ of the MTS throughout most of the 
post-war period. However in 1994, the GATT was folded into a novel international institution 
known as the WTO. In contrast to the GATT, which was a treaty, the WTO is an international 
organization that enjoys the same legal status as other international organizations such as the 
United Nations (UN) and the Bretton Woods Institutions namely the World Bank (WB) and 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
 
However, the MTS differs from the other institutions as it can be broken down into three 
individual components: ‘an inter-governmental bargaining process, a set of rules governing 
international trade relations, and a dispute settlement mechanism’.63 As an intergovernmental 
bargaining process, the GATT/WTO focuses on the liberalization of international trade. The 
trade liberalization in question has been achieved through a series of bargaining rounds that 
have taken place since 1947. The bargaining rounds in question bring GATT/WTO members 
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together to negotiate an agreement covering a specific set of trade-related issues. 
Governments have also used the GATT/WTO process to ‘develop multilateral rules for other 
trade-related issue areas’.64 During the Tokyo Round, for instance, governments addressed 
the problem of NTBs in relation to trade. These included health and safety regulations and 
government procurement practices. 
2.1.3 Principles underlying the MTS 
 
The MTS rules provide the legal framework for international trade relations. Furthermore, 
they specify how governments ought to treat and deal with each other and ‘what types of 
trade policy measures they can and cannot use’.65 In enforcing this, four principles embodied 
in these rules are used. These rules form the foundation upon which the multilateral trade 
system is based.66 Market-based liberalism is considered to be the broadest of these 
principles. According to market-based liberalism, the liberalization of international trade is an 
important objective because of the notion that, free trade raises all countries’ standards of 
living.67 This principle provides the justification for the creation of an international institution 
oriented towards the development and maintenance of a liberal trading system. 
 
The second fundamental principle that the MTS is based upon is that of non-discrimination. 
In terms of Article I of the GATT, 
 
[A]ny advantage, favour, privilege, or immunity granted by any contracting party to 
any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded 
immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the 
territories of all other contracting parties.68 
 
In respect of this principle each member of the WTO is obliged to treat all other WTO 
members in the same manner as it treats its most-favoured trading partner. This principle is 
known as the ‘Most Favoured Nation’ (MFN) principle.69 The importance of this principle 
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can be seen in its inclusion as the first article of the (GATT) which governs trade in goods.70 
Furthermore, this principle is also a priority in the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS) (Article 2) and the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) (Article 4).71 However, exceptions exist in relation to the principle of non-
discrimination namely Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) and Special or Preferential 
Treatment.72 Under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) developed countries can 
grant preferential treatment to imports from developing countries and LDCs thus granting the 
latter special access to their markets.73  
 
Closely related to the principle of non-discrimination in trade is the national treatment 
principle which was adopted by the WTO at its inception.74 In terms of this principle, 
imported and locally produced goods ought to be treated equally.75 The same principle 
applies to foreign and domestic services, and to foreign and local trademarks, copyrights and 
patents. It is important to note that ‘national treatment’ only applies once a product, service or 
item of intellectual property has entered the market.76 It follows that, charging customs duty 
on an import is not a violation of national treatment even in cases where locally-produced 
products are not charged. This principle of ‘national treatment’ is also found in all the three 
main WTO agreements.77 
 
The third principle upon which the MTS is based is the principle of reciprocity. Reciprocity 
ensures that ‘any trade concessions made by governments through multilateral bargaining are 
mutually beneficial’.78 When one country reduces tariffs on imports from another country, it 
has the right to expect the other country to make tariff concessions of equal value in return.79 
The principle of reciprocity, therefore, aims to ensure that the concessions that each country 
makes in the multilateral trade negotiations are equalled by the concessions it gains from its 
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trading partners. Lastly, multilateral trade rules incorporate ‘domestic safeguards.’ Domestic 
safeguards are ‘escape clauses that allow governments to temporarily opt out of commitments 
they have made when changes in the domestic or international [economy] reflect that 
compliance would seriously undermine the well-being of part or all of their population’.80  
2.2 GATT 
2.2.1 History of the GATT  
 
As highlighted earlier trade liberalization was achieved through a series of bargaining rounds 
that have taken place since 1947.81 States have used these rounds to progressively reduce 
tariffs on manufactured goods and to address other obstacles to international trade. Tariff 
reductions were the principal focus of the first six GATT rounds. In this respect Patrick L and 
Lattimore R note that successive rounds of multilateral trade negotiations since 1947 have 
assisted in achieving deep reductions in import duties.82 
It can be gathered from the MTS principle of reciprocity that ‘reciprocal agreements are the 
standard approach to multilateral trade bargaining’.83 As such the WTO, an MTS institution, 
facilitates Member states to liberalize trade by enabling them to enforce such reciprocal trade 
agreements.84 It will also be shown that in the early GATT Rounds, governments reduced 
tariffs by making reciprocal tariff reductions in manufacturing industries.85 According to 
Jackson H ‘the objective in each bargaining round was to reach an overall agreement in 
which the value of the total tariff concessions each government granted equalled the value of 
the total tariff concessions each government received from all other GATT system 
members’.86 It should be noted that in theory, the GATT was not an organization and as such 
the GATT did not have members. The accepting governments were known as ‘contracting 
parties’ (CPs).87 
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2.2.2 GATT: The Origins- ‘From Havana to Marrakesh’  
 
The story of GATT can be traced as back as ‘1948 in Havana (Cuba), via Annecy (France), 
Torquay (UK), Tokyo (Japan), Punta Del Este (Uruguay), Montreal (Canada), Brussels 
(Belgium) and finally to Marrakesh (Morocco) in 1994’.88 In the course of that journey ‘the 
trading system came under GATT, salvaged from the aborted attempt to create the ITO’.89 
GATT is considered to have immensely assisted in the establishment of a strong and 
prosperous MTS.90 The latter became progressively liberal through rounds of trade 
negotiations. 91 In support of the former assertion, Bhala R argues that the GATT was more 
than a tariff cutting document. It gave birth to a multilateral trade institution in Geneva.92 
This explains why the GATT is dubbed as the ‘forerunner of the WTO’.93 It is also crucial to 
note that the process of the integration of weaker countries into the MTS started with the 
commencement of GATT.94  
Bhala R argues that the origins of GATT as both the constitution of international trade law 
and the dominant multilateral trade institution lie in ‘the disastrous experience with 
protectionism in the 1930s’.95 The most important fact about GATT is that the GATT was 
never intended to be what it has become.96 In support of this point Bhala R notes that, from 
the onset GATT was intended to be a provisional legal instrument.97 It is against this 
standpoint that Bhala R also points out that ‘it was always assumed that the written product of 
the trade tariff reduction negotiations namely the GATT would terminate once the Havana 
Charter entered into force’.98 The principal and enduring agreement was to be the Havana 
Charter which would establish the ITO.99 In this respect the GATT was intended to form one 
component of a broader International Trade Organization (ITO). According to Jackson H, 
‘the GATT was to be merely an agreement on tariffs, sort of appended to and serviced by the 
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ITO’.100 This supports the assertion that the original idea, during the immediate post World 
War II period was to create an organizational counterpart to the World Bank (WB) and the 
IMF namely the ITO.101   
 
The ITO had the mandate to facilitate trade liberalization amongst other things.102 It was 
assumed that the creation of an international trade organization, ‘to promote freer trade on a 
multilateral, non-discriminatory basis and to regulate the use of devices such as trade 
preferences and state trading’ would assist achieve the abovementioned mandate.103 
However, the USA Congress objected to the ‘employment and development features’ of the 
ITO and subsequently refused to accept American participation in the ITO.104 Another reason 
advanced as to why the US rejected the ITO is that accepting it would cede too much 
sovereignty to an international body.105 Due to the ITO’s rejection by the U.S no other 
country was willing to bind itself to that Charter without its application to the then pre-
eminent economic power, the U.S.106 As a consequence of this refusal the ITO was never 
created.107  
 
This occurrence necessitated the GATT to become the central trade institution since it did not 
require congressional ratification in order to be operational.108 In support of the latter point it 
can be observed that GATT was thus thrust into the position of the principal international 
institution for controlling trade.109 Up to this day, GATT remains the most important legal 
document in International trade law.110 It has been argued that the ‘GATT-based system 
embodied the interests of the United States and Western Europe’.111 This had the profound 
effect of neglecting the concerns and needs of developing countries; as such a vast number of 
developing countries played no role in the GATT system’s creation.112 To this extent it can be 
observed that developed countries were key players in the development of the MTS. This 
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possibly explains why developing countries still struggle to be fully integrated into the MTS 
which was built with the interests of the developed countries at heart. 
 
One reason that can be advanced for the minimal participation of the developing countries in 
the MTS is that many developing countries had not yet become independent nation states by 
1947 when the GATT was created. Furthermore, the developing countries that had the 
privilege to participate in the formation of the 1947 GATT system negotiations ‘fought hard 
to link trade and development in the ITO’.113 As a consequence when the ITO failed to 
become operational, developing countries became sceptical of the MTS. Thus, most of the 
developing countries ceased to be active participants in trade liberalization.114 It can be noted 
that contrary to the expectations of the GATT-based system ability to liberalize trade, 
developing countries believed that it hindered economic development.115 The arguments 
advanced above partially show the fault-lines within the MTS namely its failure to adequately 
cater for the development needs of developing countries in its infancy stages. 
 
However, the extent to which MTS did not cater for the needs of developing countries should 
not be exaggerated. The same can be said about the perspective of the MTS by developing 
countries. In the mid-1980s developing countries began to adopt development strategies that 
emphasized the importance of international trade to economic development.116 The profound 
effect of this transition was that developing countries progressively ceased to advocate for 
fundamental reforms of the MTS. Furthermore, they became active participants in 
multilateral trade negotiations. One reason for this is that this period coincided with the 
political independence of developing countries.  
 
Such a transition also influenced the reorientation of developing country trade policies and 
this also strengthened the MTS.117 Regardless of this development it would be an 
overstatement to assert that ‘developing countries have become enthusiastic supporters of the 
MTS’.118 The reality is that ‘they no longer challenge the fundamental principles upon which 
the multilateral trade system is based’.119 Prior to this development namely between 1950 and 
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1980 developing countries had minimally participated in the process of trade liberalization.120 
Moreover, they had ‘pressed continually to supplant the GATT and replace it with an 
institutional structure that addressed their perceived development goals’.121  
 
2.2.3 The core of GATT 
 
Substantively the core of GATT can be described as including obligations which relate to 
trade in goods (but not only trade in goods).122 As highlighted earlier these essentially applied 
to constrain government regulatory actions.123 As such ‘GATT was designed to limit what 
governments could do to place hurdles on trade across borders’.124 Jackson H notes that ‘only 
a minute few of GATT obligations could be said to even impliedly apply to business firms or 
individuals’.125 This argument points to the international nature of the GATT system. These 
obligations include: 
Negotiated tariff binding MFN obligation, National Treatment obligation and a broad 
prohibition on the use of quotas (quantitative restrictions), with a few exceptions 
amongst other obligations.126 
  
It should be noted that the GATT agreement also contains a series of exceptions, some of 
which arguably make serious inroads in the obligations mentioned above. Some of the most 
prominent among the exceptions are those for: national security, intellectual property 
measures, customs unions and free trade areas (FTAs), certain measures by developing 
countries to aid economic development, and escape clause measures to slow imports to allow 
domestic industries to better adjust to competition.127 
2.3 THE GATT ROUNDS 
 
Following the demise of the ITO as highlighted earlier the GATT became the sole 
multilateral instrument governing and/or international trade.128 The GATT’s basic legal 
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principles remained much as they were in 1948 for almost half a century.129 However, they 
were supplemented or amended in the series of multilateral negotiations known as ‘trade 
rounds’.130 It will be shown that the early trade rounds focused on further reducing tariffs on 
manufactured goods.131 The Kennedy Round in the mid-1960s introduced a GATT Anti-
Dumping Agreement and a section on development.132 However, agricultural liberalisation 
was left on the periphery of these negotiations.133 It was only until the Uruguay Round that 
agricultural liberalisation became part of the core focus of the negotiations. In this respect 
Patrick L and Lattimore R point out that the UR was ‘highly significant in reinforcing the 
architecture of the world trading system and for the first time agriculture was subject to 
multilateral trade disciplines’.134 
There have been a total of nine Rounds, dedicated to the reduction of trade barriers, in the 
history of GATT.135 Although Bhala R mentions only eight there are in fact nine considering 
the current Doha Development Agenda (DDA) Round formed in 2001. Another Round 
known as the Millennium Round would have been created in 1999 at the WTO Ministerial 
Conference had it not been for the strong antagonism it received from interest groups and 
NGOs as well as developing countries representing an array of concerns.136 These concerns 
included environmental, labour, human rights and consumer protection interests. It will be 
noted that in the earlier Rounds most developing countries were neither principal suppliers 
nor major importing markets.137 As such ‘little was asked of them in terms of their own trade 
liberalization’138, thus leaving at the periphery of the trade liberalization commitment. This 
reinforces the idea that the GATT system is largely economically conducive to the developed 
countries. 
These GATT Rounds will be discussed below and the extent to which the development needs 
of developing countries were addressed under these successive GATT Rounds will be 
considered.  
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2.3.1 The early 5 Rounds: Geneva Round – Dillon Round. 
 
The first five rounds of multilateral trade negotiation succeeded in lowering tariff barriers 
substantially.139 This shifted protectionism to non-tariff barriers (NTBs). The first five rounds 
reduced average trade weighted tariff from 50 to 12%.140  
2.3.2 The Geneva Round (1947) 
 
Bhala R argues that this Round was disappointing in terms of the scope of coverage of trade 
tariffs affecting only 2.5 billion in trade.141 However, it was successful in the following 
respects namely; the CPs recognized the importance of trade liberalization in the agricultural 
sector which had been previously excluded from the disciplines of GATT.142 As such it led to 
the collapse of agricultural protectionism among developed countries which had adverse 
trade effects on domestic traders.143 Secondly, it created awareness amongst the contracting 
parties (CPs) of the need to tackle the trade and development needs of LDCs and developing 
countries.144 Such an initiative points to the initial consciousness of the MTS to the 
development needs of developing countries.  
2.3.3 The Dillon Round (1960–1962)  
 
It is suggested that the Dillon Round was created due to two threats from the European 
Economic Community (EEC) namely EEC’s common external tariff and the threat 
concerning ‘agricultural subsidies pursuant to the EEC’s common Agricultural Policy’.145 
Furthermore, the Geneva Round had drawn attention to ‘trade-distorting’146 agricultural 
policies and the Dillon Round provided an opportunity to discuss the problem.147 It should 
however, be noted that these discussions proved to be problematic and as a consequence 
‘agricultural and other politically sensitive products’ were excluded from the final deal.148 
The Dillon Round results disappointed the expectations of the GATT CPs in the following 
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respects; nothing was done to combat Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs) and tariff cuts were at 
times too shallow where they could have been deeper’.149 
2.3.4 The Kennedy Round (1964–1967) 
 
It is dubbed as the most ambitious of its predecessors as it had the objective of having ‘a 
starting point or working hypothesis of 50% reduction in tariffs on many products and 
somehow met these objectives’.150 It should be noted that prior to the Kennedy Round the 
basic approach to tariff negotiations was ‘request and offer’.151 Under this approach ‘the 
contracting parties sought to balance the concessions they were offering against those they 
were seeking’.152 As such the negotiations were essentially bilateral, but were then extended 
to other GATT CPs through the MFN (Most Favoured Nation) principle.153 The new 
approach to tariff negotiations namely the single undertaking was finally consolidated by the 
end of the Uruguay Round.154 
Bhala R proposes five factors that made the Kennedy Round successful. Firstly, it changed 
the negotiation process for cutting tariffs from the traditional product-by-product approach to 
an across-the-board or linear method.155 Secondly, its negotiations spanned over both 
agricultural as well as industrial goods.156 It should however, be noted that in respect to the 
reduction of tariffs in the agricultural sphere, the exercise was not easy.157 As such the efforts 
to liberalize trade in agriculture continued throughout the subsequent Tokyo and Uruguay 
Rounds.158 Thirdly, it led to the emergence of other CPs as the driving forces in the 
negotiating Rounds as opposed to the earlier circumstances where the US was the sole 
driving force in the negotiating Rounds.159 These new forces included Japan having acceded 
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to the GATT in 1955 and the ECC in 1957.160 These parties both emerged as key players in 
the Kennedy Round negotiations that followed.161  
Fourthly, akin to the Geneva Round the interests of the developing countries were 
discussed.162 This is evident in the number of LDCs that acceded to GATT in the early 1960s 
which were treated as non-linear countries during the Kennedy Round.163 This means that 
they participated in the tariff reductions through affirmative product specific offers.164 Lastly, 
the Round was responsible for attempting to reduce NTBs as well as other traditional trade 
barriers through establishing an AD Code.165  
2.3.5 The Tokyo Round (1973–79): ‘An initial attempt to reform the system’ 
  
This Round is significant for its recognition of the needs of developing countries namely 
through the Tokyo Round GATT codes which provided special assistance to developing 
countries.166 This Round also witnessed the first major attempt to tackle non-tariff barriers 
(NTBs) as the CPs collectively tackled the growing problem of NTBs.167 The trade tariff 
reductions achieved in the Dillon and Kennedy Rounds stimulated international trade and 
enmeshed the CPs thereto in a growing network of economic interdependence.168 However, 
despite this remarkable achievement by the two Rounds in question, more progress was 
needed on reducing trade tariff barriers on agricultural products, managing the special needs 
of developing countries and most importantly combating the outbreak of NTBs.169 
Robert Gilpin points out some of the areas that formed the core of the Tokyo discussions. 
These include violations of the non-discrimination or MFN principle through preferential 
trading arrangements namely the Lome Convention between the EEC and certain LDCs.170 
Other areas include resolution of issues related to the unilateral imposition of import 
restriction in cases of serious injury to the domestic industry namely the ‘safeguard provision 
of the GATT’, overall tariff reductions and the removal of NTBs, liberalized trade in 
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agriculture and consideration of commodity agreements amongst other areas.171 In light of 
this Gilpin argues that the primary goal of the Tokyo Round was to stabilize trading relations 
among the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries.172 
This is problematic as it creates the presumption that the development needs of developing 
countries were neglected.173 
It is also important to consider how the Tokyo Round improved on the Kennedy Round. 
Whereas under the Kennedy Round, a general formula for tariff reduction would be reduced 
by 50% for industrial goods with exceptions being negotiated between CPs; under the Tokyo 
Round tariffs were reduced according to the ‘Swiss Formula’.174 This formula had the effect 
of ‘generating deeper cuts in the highest tariffs thereby addressing the issue of tariff peaks – 
exceptionally high tariffs’.175 However, negotiations still applied to some sectors, notably 
textiles. This had the effect of avoiding the full impact that a full application of the Swiss 
Formula would have caused.176 Moreover, like the Kennedy Round many tariff negotiations 
were conducted on a linear, across-the-board basis under the Tokyo Round.177 However, its 
negotiations are argued by Bhala R to have been broader and more ambitious as they were 
open to non CPs and most significantly, they dealt with the reduction of NTBs.178 As a 
consequence the concerted effort of the Round yielded remarkable results that saw the 
emergence of a ‘comprehensive package of agreements’ which was adopted by at least 99 
countries.179 
Bhala R outlines three key results of the Round namely achievement of agreements that 
reduced NTBs, establishing of agreements on trade remedies and granting of preferential 
treatment to developing countries (GSP). Gilpin R on the other hand argues that the Round’s 
most significant accomplishment was the establishment of a number of ‘codes of good 
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behaviour’ regarding NTBs.180 These codes were meant to regulate the areas of NTBs and 
trade promotion policies namely restrictions in government procurement, granting of tax 
benefits and the use of export credits.181 However, ‘the codes’ were problematic as they were 
not accepted by the full GATT membership.182 As such they were not ‘plurilateral’ in nature 
which made them difficult to enforce.183 A plurilateral option offers a mechanism for CPs of 
the GATT to agree to rules in a policy area that is not covered by the GATT.184  Despite, this 
it can be argued that though the ‘codes’ were not ‘multilateral’ they were a significant start. 
This is supported by the fact that several codes were eventually amended during the Uruguay 
Round and turned into multilateral commitments accepted and subscribed to by all WTO 
members.185 Hoekman argues the use of the Tokyo codes was one of the reasons why the 
‘single undertaking’ was pursued in the Uruguay Round.186 It follows that many countries 
strongly felt that that the Tokyo Round plurilateral agreements had led to the excessive 
fragmentation of the trading system.187 
With regard to the last key result mentioned above namely ‘the granting of preferential 
treatment to developing countries’,  an enabling clause was agreed to and it served as the 
legal basis for the GSP scheme offered to developing countries by developed countries.188 
The GSP scheme is a non-reciprocal scheme whereby certain exports from the beneficiary 
developing countries receive duty free treatment.189 They key result in question exists as an 
exception to the non-discrimination or MFN principle of the GATT and it provides that, 
Notwithstanding the provisions of Article I of GATT contracting parties may accord 
differential and favourable treatment to developing countries without according such 
treatment to other contracting parties.190 
 
It is important to note that such a step was crucial in addressing the development needs of 
developing countries in the MTS. 
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Despite these remarkable breakthroughs in the elimination and reduction of trade barriers, the 
international economic community was faced with retarded economic growth, rapid inflation 
and high unemployment (stagflation) amongst other economic impediments.191 This resulted 
in most of the CPs including the US resorting to protectionist measures like the voluntary 
export restraints (VERs).192 These measures were discriminating quantitative measures that 
circumvented the Tokyo Round disciplines due to their voluntary nature.193 They were only 
banned when the Uruguay Round agreements were signed in terms of Article 11(1) (b) of the 
Agreement on Safeguards.194  
2.3.6 The Uruguay Round (1986–94) 
 
During the 1980s the GATT system needed a thorough overhaul.195 Jackson H, argues that 
such a time seemed convenient for the development of an international regime that would 
function to inhibit the purely protectionist impulses of governments.196 The above 
consideration was among those which led the participants in the GATT Ministerial Meeting 
of September 1986, at Punta del Este, Uruguay, to launch the eighth major GATT round of 
trade negotiations197 and ultimately to the WTO.198 The failure to establish such a Round to 
regulate global trade would have led to national regulatory systems that would have become 
‘hardened’ and difficult to dismantle in the future.199  
In the seven previous GATT rounds of trade negotiations, discussions were mainly focused 
on tariff reductions.200 It should be noted that previously developing countries had been 
focusing most of their attention on obtaining preferential access to industrial country 
markets.201 Only a few developing countries actively participated in the core business of the 
negotiations; the exchange of market access concessions.202 By contrast, under the Uruguay 
many developing countries were active participants.203 Their participation was not limited to 
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the formulation of new rules for the world trading system. Developing countries also made 
important market access offers in the ‘conventional area of reducing tariff protection on 
manufactures trade and in new areas’. The new areas in respect of which important market 
offers were made by developing countries included, inter alia, trade in services and trade in 
agricultural products.204  
Bhala R also provides another reason as to why the Uruguay Round was critically needed in 
the realm of international trade around the 1980s. She argues that amongst the most 
challenging problems faced by the world trading community after the Tokyo Round were 
substantive market access issues in key economic sectors.205 She further points out that the 
Tokyo Round had failed to deal with certain sectors adequately or at all. This was in respect 
to providing a framework for market liberalization.206 Other problems areas that necessitated 
the establishment of the Uruguay Round were ‘the burgeoning of trade in services and 
barriers to such trade remained wholly outside the GATT framework’ and a vast number of 
CPs were overly protecting their agricultural sectors through tariffs, NTBs and subsidies.207 
In light of these problems it can be noted that ‘a permanent multilateral infrastructure was 
essential in order to promote trade liberalization and deal with the expanding scope of 
international trade and policy’.208 In the words of Bhala R, it was necessary to ‘resurrect the 
ITO, ultimately under a different name; the WTO’.209 
The strongest proponent for the formation of the Uruguay Round was the United States, 
supported primarily by the Japanese and the economies of the Pacific Basin.210 A possible 
explanation provided for such a keen interest by the US in the Round, is that the Round was 
globally competitive and in some instances dominant in services, intellectual property (IP), 
industries and agriculture.211 A round that produced significant market access for the 
American economy in these sectors would be openly welcomed by the US.212 Despite its 
popularity with the US and other Pacific Basin countries, the Round was also subject to 
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antagonism by LDCs since it was not consonant with the LDCs’ interests.213 Gilpin also 
asserts that some members of the European Community opposed it on the same grounds as 
those of LDCs.214 
As was highlighted earlier, governments used the GATT/WTO process to ‘develop 
multilateral rules for other trade-related areas’.215 In this respect during the UR, governments 
created new multilateral rules in three main areas. Firstly, governments created multilateral 
rules to protect intellectual property (IP).216 In negotiating Trade-Related Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPs), ‘governments created multilateral rules that would oblige those 
countries that were not currently enforcing intellectual property rights to do so’.217 Secondly, 
international trade in services was brought into the multilateral regime as part of the 
commitment to liberalize trade.218  
Hoekman B and Kostecki M point out that during the 1980s and 1990s international trade in 
services grew more rapidly than trade in manufactured goods.219 However, regardless of this 
reality and the importance of service sector activities, there were no rules to govern and 
regulate international trade in services.220 The General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS) provided a framework for a limited amount of liberalization and for negotiations 
aimed at further liberalization.221 Finally, governments created a set of rules governing 
policies toward the foreign direct investments made by multinational corporations in the form 
of Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs).222 These rules were designed to reduce 
governments’ abilities to impose import or export requirements on multinational corporations 
(MNCs) operating in their countries.223  
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In its infancy stages the Uruguay Round, in relation to tariff negotiations, used a combined 
approach with aspects of ‘request and offer’ and a general tariff reduction target of 30% on 
average.224 As part of the GATT’s commitment to address the needs of developing countries, 
an average 36% reduction was agreed upon for developed countries in respect of agricultural 
goods.225 As highlighted earlier by the end of the Uruguay Round the notion of a ‘single 
undertaking’ had become established.226 Under this notion ‘virtually every item of the 
negotiation is part of a whole and indivisible package and cannot be agreed separately’.227 It 
should be noted that the Doha Declaration reasserts the single undertaking nature of the 
negotiation.228 It is in respect of the above that Blouin C asserts that the UR was the first of 
its kind in terms of developing country participation. Developing countries were generally 
not very active in the GATT. However, with the UR all members had to be signatories to all 
the agreements based on the single undertaking method.229 
  
A lot of merit has been awarded to the Uruguay Round in respect of trade liberalisation. For 
instance the commitment to market access received more attention under the Uruguay Round 
which produced the first multilateral agreement namely the Agreement on Agriculture, 
dedicated to agricultural trade.230 Kumar argues that the ‘Uruguay Round brought some  
significant institutional changes, which have resulted in relatively better governance of the 
world trading system under the aegis of the WTO’.231 Furthermore, this Round also advanced 
the integration of the world economy, especially the integration of developing countries into 
the MTS. Moreover, it can be noted that the Round contributed to the ‘liberalization of 
developing countries’ own trade regimes and improvements in the conditions affecting access 
to the major markets for their export products’.232 
It is evident from the discussion of the Rounds including the Uruguay Round that the issue of 
agricultural liberalisation was very problematic. In support of this Gilpin asserts that ‘the 
problem of world trade in agriculture almost defies solution’.233 
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2.3.7 Evaluation of the GATT 
 
The overall impact of the Uruguay Round trade negotiations on the MTS is mixed. Though 
the GATT was ‘provisional with a limited field of action’ its success, in promoting and 
securing liberalisation of world trade over 47 years, is incontestable.234 Furthermore, the 
momentum of trade liberalization assisted to ensure that ‘trade growth consistently out-paced 
production growth throughout the GATT era, a measure of countries’ increasing ability to 
trade with each other and to reap the benefits of trade’.235 Moreover, the rush of new CPs 
during the UR demonstrated that the MTS was recognised as an anchor for development and 
an instrument of economic and trade reform.236  
2.4 WTO 
 
The creation of the WTO in 1995 is considered to be ‘the biggest reform of international 
trade since after World War 2’.237 In support of this assertion, Hoekman B argues that the 
1995 establishment of the WTO was the ‘capstone of a gradual process of liberalization’ that 
started after WW 2.238 It is dubbed to have ‘brought to reality in an updated form that is the 
failed attempt in 1948 to create an International Trade Organization’.239 The creation of the 
WTO strengthened multilateral system.240 In this respect Patrick L and Lattimore R assert 
that multilateralism is the basis of the WTO system implying that ‘the more partners there are 
to an agreement, the better’.241 
In essence the WTO is a place where member governments meet and attempt to sort out the 
trade problems they face with each other and at ‘its heart are WTO agreements, negotiated 
and signed by the bulk of the world’s trading nations’.242 It is important to note that the 
method of signing in question is the single undertaking method which implies that once a 
nation becomes a member of the WTO it becomes bound by all of its agreements.243 The 
WTO Agreement is essentially an agreement establishing the WTO.244 It created a permanent 
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forum for Member countries to address issues affecting their multilateral trade relations as 
well as to supervise the implementation of the trade agreements negotiated under the UR.245  
The WTO Agreements mentioned above cover goods, services and intellectual property and 
they spell out the principles of liberalization as well as the permitted exceptions. 
Furthermore, they include individual countries’ commitments to lower customs tariffs and 
other trade barriers, and ‘to open up and keep open service markets’ amongst other 
functions.246 One of the functions of the WTO Agreements that are of importance to this 
thesis is its prescription of the special treatment for developing countries.247 It is important to 
note that the current WTO agreements are the legacy of commitments that countries have 
voluntarily negotiated with each other over time since 1947.248 
The functions of the WTO include administering trade agreements, providing a forum for 
trade negotiations, providing a mechanism through which governments can resolve trade 
disputes, and monitoring national trade policies.249 Although the WTO is now the 
institutional centre of the world trade system, the GATT has not disappeared.250 The WTO 
merely replaced GATT as an international organization but the GATT Agreement still exists 
as the WTO’s umbrella treaty for trade in goods, updated as a result of the Uruguay Round.251 
The GATT continues to provide many of the rules governing international trade relations. 
The creation of the WTO, therefore, ‘represented an organizational change, but it did not 
produce a new set of international trade rules’.252 The rules at the heart of the MTS are those 
that were initially established in 1947 and have been gradually revised and amended since 
that time.253 
One of the commitments of the WTO that is of significant importance to this thesis is the 
institution’s desire to contribute to its objectives by entering into reciprocal and mutually 
advantageous arrangements.254 Such arrangements are directed to the substantial reduction of 
tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in 
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international trade.255 These commitments are reflective of some of the principles underlying 
the MTS namely market-based liberalism256 and non-discrimination in trade.257 
2.5 THE DOHA ROUND (2001- PRESENT) 
 
It is not a novel fact that large economies still dominate trade and the multilateral system as 
well.258 Patrick L & Lattimore R259 argue that, this position, has however been challenged 
under the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) negotiations. They further assert that 
developing countries have grouped and regrouped with some success around different 
issues.260 These areas include cotton subsidies or special treatment of the poorest countries.261 
The Doha Round in question was formed at the Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar 
in November 2001 with the intention of concluding the DDA negotiations by 1 January 
2005.262    
One of the principal aims of the Doha Development Agenda is ‘to boost the integration of 
developing countries into world trade’.263 What makes Doha of great interest to this thesis is 
its dedication to the needs of developing countries. In support of this assertion Patrick L and 
Lattimore R note that, agriculture is at the centre of the Doha Round’s negotiations, ‘both 
because of its importance to developing countries and because of questions left unresolved 
from previous negotiations’.264 The core negotiations on agriculture under this Round 
concern three ‘pillars’. These include but not limited to market access, notably tariffs; trade-
distorting forms of domestic support and various forms of export subsidies.265 The focus 
areas of the Doha Round namely agriculture imply that developing countries have a strong 
comparative advantage in this respect.266 This follows that developing countries’ economies 
are majorly agriculture based.267 
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The DDA is committed to address the development needs of developing countries via the 
implementation decision.268 Implementation is a short-hand for developing countries’ 
problems in implementing the current WTO Agreements namely those arising from the 
Uruguay Round negotiations.269 The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS)270 together with agriculture271 and General Agreement on 
Trade and Tariffs (GATT)272 constitute the implementation decision of the Doha 
Round.273However, despite the commitment of Doha to the needs of developing countries 
impediments still exist in respect to developing countries’ market access in developed 
countries’ markets.274 As highlighted in Chapter 1 the use of NTMs or NTBs in the form of 
SPS measures threatens the commitment to address the needs of developing countries.275   
Other focus areas of DDA apart from agriculture include trade in goods (NAMA or Non-
agricultural market access) and services .The aim of the negotiations on goods is to ‘reduce, 
or, as appropriate, eliminate tariffs, including the reduction or elimination of tariff peaks, 
high tariffs, and tariff escalation, as well as non-tariff barriers, in particular on products of 
export interest to developing countries’.276  It should be noted that services were one of the 
areas where a resumption of negotiations was already mandated by the UR.277 These were 
subsequently incorporated into the DDA. The extent to which the needs of developing 
countries’ needs have been addressed in the MTS and particularly under the Doha Round can 
be seen in the Round’s extensive work programme to improve aspects of the rules or the 
manner in which they are implemented.278 Of great significance is that this is achieved at the 
request of developing countries.279 
2.4.1 Doha Round and Market access 
 
The reductions in levels of protection that are currently ‘on offer’ in WTO negotiations would 
restrict the capacity of countries to raise protection from current levels in order to protect 
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domestic industries.280 As a consequence this would force a significant further increase in 
market access and reduction in support that distorts trade and this equally applies in the case 
of both agricultural and for industrial goods.281 Gurría argues that, ‘the opening up of 
markets, further, in the Doha negotiations is one of the most important contributions that can 
be made in order to stimulate the world economy and to allow all nations to benefit from 
global economic progress’.282 Such a step will be advantageous to the development needs of 
developing countries. The conclusion of the Doha Round would assist to avoid protectionist 
reactions to the current economic situation. Moreover, it would make trade more 
predictable.283  
2.6 THE BALI PACKAGE (2013- PRESENT) 
 
Trade facilitation issues are currently being hosted by the Bali Package which forms part of 
the DDA. The Bali Package is a trade agreement which is a brainchild of the WTO Ninth 
Ministerial Conference, 2013.284 The package has the mandate of reducing global trade 
barriers. In essence the package is a ‘series of decisions aimed at streamlining trade, allowing 
developing countries more options for providing food security, boosting least-developed 
countries’ trade and helping development more generally’. 285 It is also important to note this 
is the first trade agreement approved by all the WTO Members under the WTO auspices.286  
Developed countries consider this historical development as remarkably important whereas 
developing countries express concerns in relation to the agreements. Whilst it is appreciated 
that the Bali package agreements serve an important purpose there are concerns that ‘there is 
structural imbalance in which the least-developed countries secured only best endeavour 
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solutions while there is a binding agreement on trade facilitation’.287One of the most 
significant decisions, inter alia, that forms the core of the Bali Package is the Trade 
Facilitation (TF) Agreement.288 The TF Agreement will be significant in the reduction of 
trading costs, the enhancement of transparency and provision of technical assistance to 
developing and LDCs for implementation of the Agreement.289 
 
2.7 DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM 
 
It can be gathered from earlier discussions that developing countries did not fully participate 
in the GATT activities and negotiations.290 Their participation was mainly confined to 
‘seeking exceptions from the rules and more favourable treatment from industrialised 
nations’.291 This position began to change with the formation of the Uruguay Round.292 One 
of the reasons advanced for this transition is the ‘awareness of the limitations of development 
policies based on import substitution and to the success of the East Asian ‘tigers’ in 
international markets’.293 Another reason advanced for this transition is that some developing 
countries faced the threat of unilateral action against their exports in certain markets.294 On 
the other hand others especially smaller developing countries were under the apprehension 
that they would be excluded from emerging regional trading blocs.295 
However, the formation of the Uruguay Round and its ability to address the needs of 
developing countries should not be overemphasized.  Some developing countries still lacked 
the resources to implement certain obligations in the UR.296 Their dissatisfaction is evident in 
their perspective of the transition periods provided to ease the adjustment process, which they 
considered to be inadequate.297 Patrick L and Lattimore R argue that this problem led to the 
intensified calls for further differentiation in WTO rules to take into account the special needs 
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and capacity limitations of developing countries.298 In an effort to address these concerns 
initiatives like the Aid for Trade (AfT) initiative led by the WTO and OECD were 
implemented.299  
Another important initiative meant to address the needs of developing countries is found in 
the WTO Agreements. Special and differential treatment (S & D or SDT) provisions were 
introduced in the WTO Agreements by the WTO.300 These provisions afford developing 
countries special rights to assist them in meeting implementation periods.301 More 
specifically S&D provisions allow countries to provide more favourable treatment to 
developing and least developed countries which may have more difficulties in adjusting to 
the impact of trade liberalisation.302 This allows the latter countries to ‘take advantage of new 
trading opportunities and to shoulder the costs associated with reform’.303 
The extent to which the needs of developing countries have been addressed under the MTS is 
evident in the WTO’s Dispute Settlement System (DSS) and more particularly the existence 
of a Dispute Settlement Body (DSB).304 The DSS is intended to assist resolve disputes that 
arise among governments with respect to their legal obligations under the WTO rules.305 The 
formation of these bodies under the WTO has facilitated further participation of developing 
countries in the MTS.306 This is demonstrated by the Cotton Subsidies Case307 brought by 
Brazil against the United States. This highlights that developing countries are becoming more 
active in seeking WTO arbitration.308 Moreover, developing countries have initiated more 
than 40% of the disputes submitted to its Dispute Settlement Mechanism to date.309 Whereas 
the active participation in the WTO arbitration may be applauded as a positive move to 
address the needs of developing countries, this may be suggestive of a loophole in the MTS 
and its sensitivity to the needs of developing countries. The increase in the number of 
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complaints being brought against developed countries by developing countries may suggest 
that the needs of developing countries have not been effectively addressed by the MTS.  
2.8 CONCLUSION 
 
Having discussed the history of developing countries in the MTS it is imperative to assess 
whether the development needs of developing countries were effectively addressed. A 
number of points can be noted from the discussion above. There has been a general 
improvement in the treatment of developing countries’ needs in the MTS. Hoekman B, 
asserts that ‘many developing countries want to see the rules and processes adapted to better 
support development objectives’.310 The GATT/WTO Rounds have made giant steps in 
attempting to achieve these objectives by liberalizing trade and enhancing market access.  
The importance of market access was also highlighted in the discussion of the MTS.  
Inasmuch as there has been a determined effort to improve the development needs of 
developing countries in the GATT/WTO Rounds there exists a new threat to the market 
access of developing countries. This threat is in the form of proliferation of NTBs or NTMs 
which can be potentially used as protectionist tools. The NTBs that are the particular 











                                                          




A CRITICAL LEGAL ANALYSIS OF SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY 
MEASURES AND THE AGREEMENT ON SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY 




The preceding chapter addressed the extent to which the multilateral trading system (MTS) 
has addressed the development needs of developing countries. The conclusion was that the 
MTS did not effectively address most of the key development needs of developing countries. 
This accounts for the myriad of pending issues involving developing countries currently 
being discussed under the Doha Round as well as the Bali package.311 One of the main key 
concerns raised in the preceding chapter in this respect is that most developing countries have 
struggled and still struggle to ‘become fully integrated into the world trading system’.312  
In determining the extent to which SPS measures impede trade between developing and 
developed countries this chapter will firstly highlight how market access is crucial for the full 
integration of developing countries into the world trading system. It will further highlight 
how SPS measures impede the market access in question. Secondly, the chapter will delve 
into a historical background of the SPS Agreement in order to understand the purpose for its 
formation. Lastly this chapter will undertake a critical legal analysis of the central provisions 
of the SPS Agreement and determine the extent to which the Agreement extent has been 
effective in enhancing market access for developing countries. 
3.1.1 Market access and the SPS Agreement 
 
The emphasis on the importance of market access has its basis on the evidence that, ‘more 
outward oriented countries tend to develop more rapidly than inward oriented countries’.313 
In essence market access allows developing countries, for instance, to export products which 
they have comparative advantage in.314 According to Henson S and Loader R evidence 
suggests that developing countries have ‘a potential comparative advantage over developed 
                                                          
311 9TH WTO Ministerial Conference ( 2013) ‘Bali Ministerial Declaration and Decisions’ available at 
http://wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/mc9_e/balipackage_e.htm ACCESSED ON 08 AUGUST 2014 
312 Henson & Loader (note 1 above) 85 
313 See, for example, IMF ‘World Economic Outlook’ May 1997; TN Srinivasan & J Bhagwati ‘Outward 
Orientation and Development: Are the Revisionists Right?’ Yale University Economic Growth Center 
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countries in the production of agricultural products’.315 Thus, market access is of significant 
importance as it enhances developing countries’ exportation of their agricultural products. 
Consequently, if SPS measures are erected by the developed countries they might have the 
negative impact of limiting the market access for developing countries in products that the 
latter has comparative advantage in. 
The promulgation of the Agreement served to regulate and govern the development and 
application of SPS measures. This is consonant to the Agreement’s preamble namely to 
establish a multilateral framework of rules and disciplines to achieve the aforementioned 
goal. One of the central and underlying reasons for regulating the application of SPS 
measures is to minimise their negative effects on trade. These include hindering of market 
access of developing countries in particular.316 This occurs when SPS measures are applied in 
a manner which could constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between members. 
The application of SPS measures in a discriminatory manner as contemplated above is in 
essence a violation of the Most Favoured Nation principle which prevents the unjustifiable 
differential treatment between trading partners.317 The use of SPS measures in manner that 
hinders market access may also occur when the SPS measures are applied as domestic 
protectionist tools. This in essence also constitutes as a violation of the national treatment 
principle which requires imported and locally produced goods to be treated equally.318  
The emphasis of the SPS Agreement on market access shows the critical importance of 
market access for the successful integration of developing countries into the global 
economy.319 The aforegoing suggests that SPS measures due to their complex nature appear 
to pose a threat to the achievement of market access for developing countries. Even more, 
                                                          
315 Henson & Loader (note 1 above) 86 
316 Ibid 88- However, it should be appreciated that standards serve an important role in trade vis protection of 
human, animal or plant life or health even protection against importation of substandard or low quality products. 
317 Art 1 GATT (1994) 
318 Ibid Art 3 
319 The SPS Agreement, inter alia, is cognisant ‘that developing country Members may encounter special 
difficulties in complying with the SPS measures of importing Members and as a consequence in access to 
markets…’ See (note 311 above); Annex 3A -Understanding on tariff rate quota administration provisions of 
agricultural products as defined in article 2 of the AoA.  Also see Duty-Free and Quota-Free Market Access for 
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sanitary or phytosanitary measures of importing Members, and as a consequence in access to markets and also 
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Josling T has noted that SPS measures can act as significant barriers to entry into a particular 
market.320  
Josling T and Roberts D assert that though SPS measures are desirable as a way of protecting 
plant, animal and human health in the importing country, ‘they are sometimes formulated and 
implemented in a way that makes it unnecessarily difficult for foreign producers to 
compete’.321 As such they can constitute trade barriers as effective as traditional tariffs.322 
The WTO on the other hand mandates trade to be competitive but fair for all member 
countries and more particularly for developing countries.323 The reality of the problem is that 
developed countries formulate and implement SPS measures more than developing 
countries.324 This makes developing countries’ producers more susceptible to the obstacles 
imposed by SPS measures.325 The aforegoing discussion highlights the critical need to 
address the background and specific problems related to SPS measures that concern 
developing countries. 
3.2 BACKGROUND OF THE SPS AGREEMENT AND SPS MEASURES 
 
The SPS Agreement was enacted in order to regulate the application and implementation of 
these SPS measures. For the purpose of this thesis, it is thus important to also consider the 
extent to which the SPS Agreement has stood up to its commitment of enhancing market 
access particularly for developing countries.  This question will be addressed by critically 
discussing the central provisions of the SPS Agreement. Before the Uruguay Round (UR) 
Agreements were concluded, the rules governing and regulating SPS measures had not been 
fully elaborated in a multilateral agreement.326 However, SPS measures were covered by 
GATT namely Article XX (b)327 and the Tokyo Round Standards Code.328 Despite the 
                                                          
320 Josling & Roberts (note 36 above) ACCESSED 10 JULY 2014 
321 Ibid.  
322 Ibid; also see LR Horton ‘Food from developing countries: Steps to improve compliance’ (1998) 53 Food 
and  Drug Law Journal 139-171 
323 For  further discussion see WTO (note 14 above) ACCESSED ON 07 AUGUST 2014 
324 See Henson & Loader (note 1 above) 86  
325 It is suggested that SPS measures are particularly an issue for developing countries. It follows that, if 
compliance with technical requirements is a prerequisite for successful export trade the market access of 
developing countries into developed countries is substantially limited. This is due to the fact that developing 
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326 Bhala (note 92 above) 1666 
327 Historically, the GATT took into cognizance the right of Contracting Parties (CPs) [as they were referred to 
as back then] to take certain measures as contemplated in Article XX of the GATT. This right applied even if 
those measures taken by a CP imposed trade restrictions on other CPs. As such Article XX functioned as an 
exceptions clause. The specific article namely Article XX (b) provided that ‘subject to the requirement that such 
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existence of these instruments they could not successfully cope with the trade restrictive 
effects of various convoluted measures adopted for sanitary and phytosanitary purposes.329 
For example the rules under the GATT Article XX (b), neither sufficiently clarified nor 
specified how to deal with complicated SPS measures.330 In this light, it can be argued that 
the negotiations on Sanitary and Phytosanitary initially began as an attempt to elaborate on 
the provisions of Article XX (b).  
During the negotiations that preceded the launching of the Uruguay Round (UR), the 
contracting parties (CPs) agreed, as a subject for negotiation, to minimize ‘the adverse effects 
that SPS measures and barriers can have on trade in agriculture, taking into account the 
relevant international agreements’.331 It was upon this backdrop that the subsequent 
negotiations to establish rules on SPS measures were conducted in the context of the 
Agreement on Agriculture (AOA) 332 Finally, the ‘Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of 
the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations’333 (hereinafter the ‘Brussels Draft’) 
issued on December 1990 included the draft text on SPS measures, entitled ‘Decision by CPs 
on the application of SPS measures’334 (hereinafter ‘Decision on SPS Measures’), as 
Appendix D of Agreement on Agriculture. 
In essence the Punta del Este Declaration, which launched the UR in September 1986, called 
for ‘increased disciplines in three areas in the agricultural sector: market access; direct and 
indirect subsidies; and SPS measures’.335 On the latter, the negotiators sought to ‘develop a 
multilateral system that would allow simplification and harmonization of SPS measures, as 
well as elimination of all restrictions that lack any valid scientific basis’.336 It is of vital 
importance to note that the ‘Decision on SPS Measures’ constituted a foundation for 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
between countries where the same  conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing 
in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of 
measures necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health’  
328 See D Ahn ‘Comparative analysis of the SPS and TBT Agreements’ (2008) 3-4 
329 Ibid 4 
330 Ibid  
331 [GATT, BISD. 33th Supp. 19, 24 (1987)]The text of the Punta del Este Ministerial Declaration states, with 
respect to agriculture, that ‘Negotiations shall aim to achieve greater liberalization of trade in agriculture and 
bring all measures affecting import access and export competition under strengthened and more operationally 
effective GATT rules and disciplines, taking into account the general principles governing the negotiations, by: 
(iii) minimizing the adverse effects that sanitary and phytosanitary regulations and barriers can have on trade in 
agriculture, taking into account the relevant international agreements’. 
332 Ahn (note 328 above) 
333 GATT, MTN.TNC/W/35/Rev.1 (dated on Dec. 3, 1990). 
334 GATT, MTN.GNG/NG5/WGSP/7 (dated on Nov. 20, 1990). 
335 [GATT, BISD. 33th Supp. 19, 24 (1987)] 
336 [GATT, BISD. 33th Supp. 19, 24 (1987)] 
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articulating rules on SPS measures and their implementation.337 This draft was subsequently 
modified and included as ‘Part C’ of the ‘Text on Agriculture’ in the Dunkel Draft.338 The 
Decision on SPS Measures was later separated from the AOA and included in Annex 1A of 
the ‘Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization’ as the ‘Agreement on 
the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures’.339 One author, Ahn D asserts that 
‘due to this natal origin, the SPS Agreement has a major implication for measures concerning 
agricultural products’.340 However, it should be noted that the jurisdictional ambit of the SPS 
Agreement is not confined to agricultural products, only.341  
In comparison to the Tokyo Standards Code and Article XX (b) the SPS Agreement was 
broader and extended beyond the scope and coverage of the existing GATT provisions.342 For 
example the current SPS Agreement includes provisions on new obligations namely 
transparency requirements; the provision of notification and an opportunity to comment on 
proposed SPS measures.343 
 
3.2.1 The underlying reasons for the formation of the SPS Agreement 
 
The discussion above has highlighted that the SPS Agreement was created to exclusively 
regulate the formulation, implementation and application of SPS measures. The SPS 
Agreement has drawn much attention from the WTO Member countries. One of the reasons 
advanced for this is that many of the recent trade barriers, particularly for agricultural 
                                                          
337 Ahn (note 328 above) 
338 One significant aspect that distinguished the Dunkel Draft from the Brussels Draft is that the former 
contained a provision that specified the relationship between the SPS Agreement and the Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement). As such the Dunkel Draft clarified the exclusivity of the two 
Agreements, a problem that existed prior to the enactment of both Agreements. Currently both Agreements 
contain provisions that reinforce the mutual exclusivity relationship of these Agreements. For example Article 
1.5 of the TBT Agreement stipulates that its provisions do not apply to SPS measures as defined in Annex A of 
the SPS Agreement. In the same manner Article 1.4 of the SPS Agreement provides that ‘[n]othing in this 
Agreement shall affect the rights of Members under the TBT Agreement with respect to measures not within the 
scope of this Agreement’. 
339 Annex 1A of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization 
340 Ahn (note 328 above) 5 
341 In particular, Paragraph 2 of the Annex 1 of the Agreement on Agriculture explicitly stipulates that the 
product coverage of the SPS Agreement is not limited to agricultural products. See Annex 1 (2) - The 
aforegoing shall not limit the product coverage of the SPS Agreement. 
342 Bhala (note 92 above) 1666 
343 In this respect Article 7 of the SPS Agreement obliges ‘Members to notify changes in their SPS measures and 
provide information thereof in accordance with the provisions of Annex B’. The latter stipulates regulations 
meant to promote transparency inter alia publication of regulations promptly (Annex 1B), establishment of 
Enquiry points (Annex 3B) and notification procedures (Annex 5B) 
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products, take the form of SPS measures.344 It should be noted that while standards and 
regulations can promote trade, they may also be used as powerful tools to impede 
international trade and protect domestic producers as alluded to earlier.345  
Unjustified SPS measures are frequently employed when other barriers to trade inter alia 
tariffs and non- tariff import restrictions are either reduced or removed.346 This situation, 
however, produces anomalous results. For instance developing countries would negotiate the 
elimination of high tariffs or import quotas for a product only to be confronted with an 
unjustified SPS measure that negates the benefit of an earlier negotiation.347 The drafters of 
the AoA probably had this in mind when they included a provision related to the SPS 
measures.348 To support this assertion Bhala R argues that, ‘the SPS Agreement was 
negotiated in conjunction with the AoA to ensure that the benefits of liberalized agricultural 
trade would not be undermined through the application of protectionist trade barriers 
disguised as SPS measures.’349  
It can be concluded from the aforegoing that the SPS Agreement as negotiated during the UR 
was enacted due to the concern that SPS measures might be used for protectionist 
measures.350 Furthermore, article 2 (3) of the SPS Agreement explicitly provides inter alia 
that, ‘…SPS measures shall not be applied in a manner which would constitute a disguised 
restriction on international trade’.351 The Agreement in essence recognizes the Member 
countries’ rights to maintain SPS measures for the protection of human, animal or plant life 
or health. However, it requires them to base them on scientific principles and not to use them 
as disguised restrictions to trade.352  
                                                          
344 Ahn (note 328 above) 1 
345S Zarrilli ‘WTO Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement: Issues for developing countries’ South Centre 
T.R.A.D.E.Working paper series (1999) 1 
346 Bhala (note 92 above) 1667 
347 Ibid  
348 In support of the argument above the preamble of the AOA inter alia provides that, the Agreement is 
‘committed to achieving specific binding commitments in each of the following areas: market access; domestic 
support; export competition; and to reaching an agreement on sanitary and phytosanitary issues’. 
349 Bhala (note 92 above) 1667 The AoA has a specific provision that relates to the SPS Agreement. Namely 
Article which obliges Members to give effect to the SPS Agreement 
350 This is evident in the Agreement’s preamble and Art 2 (3).  
Preamble: ‘[R]eaffirming that no Member should be prevented from adopting or enforcing measures necessary 
to protect human, animal or plant life or health, subject to the requirement that these measures are not applied in 
a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between Members where 
the same conditions prevail or a disguised restriction on international trade; [D]esiring the establishment of a 
multilateral framework of rules and disciplines to guide the development, adoption and enforcement of sanitary 
and phytosanitary measures in order to minimize their negative effects on trade’. 
351 Art 2 (3) SPS Agreement 
352 See Article 2 (1)-(3) SPS Agreement -Basic Rights and Obligations of the Member countries 
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Developing countries have always been sceptical of SPS measures and their impact on 
agricultural exports.353 As a consequence developing countries strongly advocated for the 
removal of SPS measures which according to them acted as non-tariff barriers (NTBs) to 
trade.354 Therefore, they supported the ‘international harmonization of SPS measures to 
prevent developed countries from imposing arbitrarily strict standards’.355 Subsequently, the 
negotiators of the WTO Agreements considered that SPS measures ‘merited special attention 
due to their close link to agricultural trade, a particular sector of trade that was notoriously 
difficult to liberalise’.356 As a result SPS measures are now dealt with in a separate agreement 
as mentioned earlier namely the SPS Agreement. 
 
3.3 SCOPE AND APPLICATION OF THE AGREEMENT ON THE APPLICATION 
OF SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY MEASURES 
 
Article 1 (1) establishes the scope and coverage of the SPS Agreement and it expressly 
stipulates that the Agreement ‘applies to all sanitary and phytosanitary measures which may, 
directly or indirectly, affect international trade’. As such two requirements have to be 
satisfied for a measure to fall within the ambit of the agreement, thus, it must be: 
 
i. a sanitary and phytosanitary measure and  
ii. a measure that may directly or indirectly affect international trade.  
 
In respect of the first requirement, SPS measures are measures aimed at the protection of 
human, animal or plant life or health from certain specified risks.357 The question of whether 
a measure is an ‘SPS measure’ depends on its purpose or aim.358 It appears as though that the 
intention of the Member country and/or objective of the measure is the standard for 
                                                          
353 Zarrilli (note 345 above) 11 
354 Ibid 3 
355 Ibid  
356 P. Bossche, D Prévost & M Matthee ‘WTO Rules on Technical Barriers To Trade’ Maastricht Working 
Papers (2005-6) 27 To emphasize the problematic nature of agricultural trade liberalisation in world trade 
Gilpin argues that the area of agriculture in respect of liberalisation almost defies solution -see Gilpin (note 170 
above) 196  
357 Annex 1A (a) - (d) of the SPS Agreement. In broad terms, an ‘SPS measure’ is one that ‘aims at the 
protection of human or animal life or health from food-borne risks; or aims at the protection of human, animal 
or plant life or health from risks from pests or  diseases’. See Bossche et al (note 356 above) 29 
358 It is also important to note that an SPS measure may take any one of a broad range of forms including laws, 
decrees, regulations, requirements and procedures as contemplated in Annex A. It follows that once a measure is 
directed at one of the goals listed in Annex 1A (a) - (d) of the Agreement, it is covered by the SPS Agreement 
regardless of the specific form it takes. 
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determining whether a measure is one that qualifies to be an SPS measure.359 It is also 
important to note that the definitions in Annex A specifically refer to the protection of 
human, animal or plant life or health ‘within the territory of the Member’.360 This has the 
effect of excluding measures aimed at extra-territorial health protection from the ambit of the 
SPS Agreement.361 Furthermore, it should be noted that the scope of application of the SPS 
Agreement is not limited to discriminatory SPS measures. It equally applies to non-
discriminatory measures. 
The second requirement for the application of the SPS Agreement as contemplated in the 
Agreement is that the measure in question ‘may directly or indirectly affect international 
trade’.362 Thus, if a measure does not have any trade effect the Agreement does not apply to 
it. It can be argued that the second requirement is easy to satisfy.363 The reasoning behind this 
assertion is that, any measure that applies to imports can be said to affect international 
trade.364 Furthermore, the relevant provision of the Agreement365 only requires that the 
measure ‘may affect international trade’. The fact that the measure in question merely has the 
potential to affect international trade does not exclude the measure from the ambit of the SPS 
Agreement.366  
3.4 THE EXTENT OF THE SPS AGREEMENT’S EFFECTIVENESS IN 
ENHANCING MARKET ACCESS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES  
 
This chapter now has to consider the extent to which the provisions in the said agreement 
have or can enhance market access for developing countries. It was highlighted that the SPS 
Agreement was enacted in order to regulate and ‘guide the development, adoption and 
                                                          
359 It would appear that the ‘purpose of a measure would be determined objectively, rather than by attempting to 
determine the subjective aim of the Member imposing it. The latter would have the clearly unintended result of 
enabling a Member to evade the disciplines of the SPS Agreement by denying that the purpose of its measure’ is 
one of those contemplated by the Annex 1A definition. See D Prévost ‘WTO SPS Measures, Dispute settlement’ 
2003 UNCTAD 4; Also see Bhala (note 92 above) 1667-The question whether a measure is an SPS measure is 
‘determined by the intent of the measure’. It follows that if the measure is not intended to protect against the 
enumerated risks the measure is not an SPS measure.  
360 Annex 1A (a) - (d) SPS Agreement. 
361 See Bossche et al (note 356 above) 29 
362 Article 1(1) SPS Agreement 
363 It should be noted that ‘empirical proof of a reduction in trade flows is not required, but it suffices to show 
that the measure is applied to imports and therefore can be presumed to have an impact on international trade’. 
The requirement of ‘an effect on international trade should thus be easy to fulfil and has in fact not been in 
dispute in any SPS case’ thus far. see  (note 359) 5  
364 Bossche et al (note 356 above) 29 
365 See note 362 above  
366 In support of this assertion the Panel in the EC Hormones case noted that ‘there are no additional 
requirements for the applicability of the SPS Agreement’. (See Panel Report EC - Hormones (Canada), para. 
8.39; and Panel Report EC Hormones (US), para.8.36). 
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enforcement of SPS measures in order to minimize their negative effects on trade’.367 It is 
thus, imperative to analyse the provisions of the SPS Agreement in order to determine the 
extent to which the SPS Agreement has been effective in enhancing market access for 
developing countries. As highlighted earlier this question will be addressed by critically 
discussing the central provisions of the SPS Agreement, under the next subheading. Zarrilli 
argues that despite the concern that some SPS measures may be inconsistent with the SPS 
Agreement and unfairly impede the flow of trade and more particularly agricultural trade; 
developing countries are not well positioned to address this issue.368 The resultant effect of 
this situation is that developing countries struggle to access markets of developed countries 
which have a monopoly on the use of SPS measures.369  
 
3.5 MAIN AND CENTRAL PROVISIONS OF THE SPS AGREEMENT 
 
3.5.1 Right to take SPS measures (Art. 2.1) 
 
The basic rights and obligations or the basic principles of the SPS Agreement, contained in 
Articles 2 and 3 thereof, reflect the underlying aim of addressing the need to increase market 
access for food and agricultural products.370 At the same time the Agreement is also 
cognisant of the sovereign right of governments to take measures to protect human, animal 
and plant life and health in their territories.371 This position substantially differs from the 
position under the GATT rules, where discriminatory measures or quantitative restrictions are 
in principle prohibited and justification for such measures would be found under Article XX 
                                                          
367 The SPS Agreement preamble inter alia highlights the Agreement’s drafters’ commitment to ‘establish a 
multilateral framework of rules and disciplines to guide the development, adoption and enforcement of SPS 
measures in order to minimize their negative effects on trade’. 
368 It is submitted that this is the case because most developing countries lack the adequate or requisite 
institutional and infrastructural capacity to deal with SPS requirements and problems associated with them. See 
Zarrilli (note 345 above) 3 
369 The problems in question include (but not limited to), ‘the lack complete information on the number of 
measures that affect their exports; uncertainty of whether these measures are consistent or inconsistent with the 
SPS Agreement; lack of reliable estimates on the impact such measures have on their exports and developing 
countries’ serious problems with issues related to scientific research, testing, conformity assessment and 
equivalency’ See ibid 
370 Bossche et al (note 356 above) 33 The basic principles of the Agreement as contemplated above include; ‘the 
sovereign right of WTO Members to take SPS measures; the obligation  to  take  or maintain only SPS measures 
necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health (the ‘necessity requirement’); the obligation to take or 
maintain only SPS measures based on scientific principles and on sufficient scientific evidence (the ‘scientific 
disciplines’); the obligation not to adopt or maintain SPS measures that arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate 
or constitute a disguised restriction on trade; and the obligation to base SPS measures, as much as possible and 
appropriate, on international standards (the ‘goal of harmonisation’)’ 
371 Art 2 (1) SPS Agreement 
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(b).372 It can be argued that the SPS Agreement has a wider scope than the GATT rules in in 
respect of the application of SPS measures.373 
It should be noted that the right to take SPS measures is subject to the disciplines contained in 
the provisions of the SPS Agreement as a whole.374 An example of a discipline contemplated 
above is Article 5 which deals with risk assessment and the determination of the Appropriate 
Level of Protection (ALOP).375 Such provisions complement the existing GATT rules 
applicable to health measures through the introduction of scientific requirements for the use 
of SPS measures.376 The Agreement envisages some limitations to the application of SPS 
measures in order to promote trade. It can be argued that such limitations, as contemplated in 
Article 2 of the Agreement, if adhered to will enhance market access for developing 
countries. 
 
3.5.1.1 Necessity Requirement (Art. 2.2) 
 
Firstly, Article 2.2 in particular envisages the necessity requirement as a way of promoting 
international trade. It provides that, 
‘[M]embers shall ensure that any SPS measure is applied only to the extent necessary 
to protect human, animal or plant life or health …’377 
 
It follows that the sovereign right of Members to take SPS measures is limited only to extent 
of the purpose contemplated in Article 2 (2). This in essence safeguards against the arbitrary 
use of SPS measures thus regulating their impact on international trade; in particular market 
access. It is submitted that the necessity requirement in question mirrors the necessity 
requirement contained in Article XX (b) of the GATT 1994 namely the health policy 
exception. The Panel in Thailand-Cigarettes defined a measure as ‘necessary’ when there is 
                                                          
372 See (note 327 above) Also see Bossche et al (note 356 above) 33  
373 This difference in between treatment of discriminatory measures under the SPS Agreement and GATT 1994, 
Article XX (b) has ‘important implications for the burden of proof in dispute settlement proceedings. Under the 
GATT 1994, a Member imposing a discriminatory health measure or one that constitutes a quantitative 
restriction bears the burden of proof to show that it complies with the requirements of the Article XX (b) 
exception. On the contrary, under the SPS Agreement, the complaining Member must show that the measure is 
inconsistent with the rules of the SPS Agreement’. See Bossche et al (note 356 above) 33 
374 Arts 2 (2) & 2 (3) SPS Agreement  
375 Annex 5A of the SPS Agreement defines ALOP as ‘the level of protection deemed appropriate by the 
Member establishing an SPS measure to protect human, animal or plant life or health within its territory’. This 
principle is also known as ‘acceptable level of risk’ 
376 Art 5 SPS Agreement 
377 Ibid Art 2 (2) 
54 
 
‘no alternative measure consistent with GATT obligations that a Member could be expected 
to employ in order to achieve the desired public health objective’.378 In addition, the Panel in 
US-Gasoline further clarified that the ‘requirement of necessity under Article XX (b) does 
not examine the necessity of the state’s policy objective, but rather the necessity of the 
disputed measure to achieve that objective’.379 The necessity requirement in Article 2 (2) has 
not yet been subject to interpretation in dispute settlement. As this requirement is made more 
specific in other provisions of the SPS Agreement, Members prefer to challenge SPS 
measures under these more specific provisions.380  
3.5.1.2 Scientific disciplines (Art. 2.2) 
 
Apart from the limitation contemplated above, Article 2 (2) of the SPS Agreement also 
introduces new scientific disciplines for the use and maintenance of SPS measures.381 This 
provision requires any SPS measure to be based on scientific principles. It follows that an 
SPS measure should not be maintained without sufficient scientific evidence except as 
provided for in Article 5 (7) which envisages the precautionary principle. This principle in 
essence provides for the possibility to adopt provisional SPS measures where scientific 
information is insufficient, under certain conditions.382 The SPS Agreement ‘necessity’ and 
‘science-based’ requirements earmark ‘science as the touchstone against which SPS measures 
must be judged’.383 In asserting the essentiality of scientific disciplines, the Appellate Body 
in EC - Hormones held that:  
‘The requirements of   risk assessment under Article 5.1, as well as of ‘sufficient 
scientific evidence’ under Article 2.2, are essential for the maintenance of the delicate 
and carefully negotiated balance in the SPS Agreement between the shared, but 
                                                          
378Panel Report, Thailand-Cigarettes, para. 15 
379 Panel Report, US-Gasoline, para 6.22 
380An example of such a ‘more specific provision’ is Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement, which ‘requires SPS 
measures not to be more trade restrictive than required to achieve their policy objective’. For this assertion see 
Bossche et al (note 356 above) 34 
381 Ibid.  
382 Article 5 (7) may be regarded as a particular formulation of the precautionary principle. See ibid. however the 
principle is also incorporated in paragraph 6 of the Preamble and Article 3 (3) of the SPS Agreement. The 
precautionary principle is ‘a notion which supports taking protective action before there is complete scientific 
proof of a risk; that is, action should not be delayed simply because full scientific information is lacking’.  
see WTO ‘Current Issues: The precautionary principle’ available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/sps_agreement_cbt_e/c8s2p1_e.htm ACCESSED ON 27 
NOVEMBER 2014 
383 Bossche et al (note 356 above) 34-These scientific requirements are further elaborated on, in Article 5 (1) 
which provides that ‘SPS measures must be based on a risk assessment’. 
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sometimes competing interests of promoting international trade and of protecting the 
life and health of humans…’384 
 
The Agreement’s requirement that measures be based on scientific principles and not be 
maintained ‘without sufficient scientific evidence’ has some serious implications on the 
interpretation of the Agreement. It follows that a WTO Panel is not authorized to substitute 
its scientific judgement for that of the government maintaining the SPS measure.385 This 
implication affords member countries more protection in terms of the SPS measures that they 
may adopt. The problem is further heightened by the fact that, the term ‘scientific’ is not 
separately defined in the text of the SPS Agreement.386 This can potentially affect the 
determination of what constitutes ‘scientific principles’ as contemplated by the Agreement. 
Bhala R proposes such a determination ought to be undertaken in light of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).387 Furthermore, as per the rules pertaining to the 
interpretation of treaties, the term ‘scientific’ is to ‘be interpreted in good faith using its 
ordinary meaning in context and in light of the object and purpose of the Agreement’.388 
3.5.1.3 No arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or disguised restriction on trade (Art. 
2.3) 
 
Thirdly, Article 2 (3) of the SPS Agreement also functions as a basic limitation on a 
Member’s sovereign right to impose SPS measures. It achieves this by requiring all member 
countries to ensure that their SPS measures ‘do not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate 
between Members where identical or similar conditions prevail, including between their own 
territory and that of other Members…’389 It is also important to note that Article 2 (3) in 
essence reinforces the WTO/GATT non-discrimination obligations namely the MFN 
principle and the national treatment principles.390 It can be argued that this emphasizes the 
Agreement’s purposed goal to alleviate the difficulties encountered by developing countries 
in accessing markets of developed countries. In support of this it can be argued that Article 2 
                                                          
384 Appellate Body Report, EC - Hormones, para. 177 
385 Bhala (note 92 above) 1669 
386 Ibid 1668 
387 Ibid  
388 Article 31 (1) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 
389 Article 2 (3) SPS Agreement 
390 Arts 1 (3), 3 (4) GATT (1994) respectively & Chapeau of Article XX thereof 
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(3) reiterates the requirements in the ‘chapeau’ of Article XX of GATT 1994 ‘that are 
designed to ensure that SPS measures are not padded with extra obstacles to trade’.391 
 
3.5.2 The goal of harmonisation (Art.3) 
 
The Agreement also lays a foundation for the harmonisation392 of SPS measures around 
international standards in Article 3, as contemplated by Annex 3A.393 The underlying purpose 
for harmonisation lies in the ‘different factors that regulators take into account when enacting 
SPS measures’394 which in turn result in major differences in SPS measures across countries. 
This situation has a number of negative implications on market access for developing 
countries, which are more likely to be the victims of these occurrences.395 An underlying 
reason could be that developing countries’ exporters will be compelled to adjust their 
products to suit different SPS measures from one member country to another.  
 
In fulfilling the goal of harmonization the Article envisages three autonomous choices with 
regard to international harmonised standards, each with its own consequences.396 The 
objective in promoting the use of international standards is to harmonize different member 
countries’ SPS measures on as wide a basis as possible to facilitate trade.397 Consequently 
member countries may choose to ‘either base their SPS measures on (emphasis intended) 
international standards according to Article 3(1) or conform their SPS measures to 
international standards under Article 3 (2) or impose SPS measures resulting in a higher level 
of protection than would be achieved by the relevant international standard in terms of Article 
                                                          
391 Bhala (note 92 above)1669 
392 Annex 2A of the SPS Agreement defines harmonization as ‘the establishment, recognition and application of 
common sanitary and phytosanitary measures by different Members’. 
393 The EC – Hormones case is instructive of the main object and purpose of Article 3 namely ‘…to promote the 
harmonization of the SPS measures of Members on as wide a basis as possible, while recognizing and 
safeguarding, at the same time, the right and duty of Members to protect the life and health of their people’. See 
Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones para. 177. Also see Annex 3A SPS Agreement which recognizes 
guidelines and recommendations established by the Codex Alimentarius Commission for food safety the 
standards, those developed by the International Office of Epizootics (OIE) for animal health and those 
developed under the auspices of the Secretariat of the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) for plant 
protection. 
394 Bossche et al (note 356 above) 39- These factors include geographical factors and climatic conditions 
amongst other factors. 
395 Ibid  
396 Ibid 40 
397 This aspect of the Agreement reiterates the Agreement’s commitment to enhance market access for foreign 
producers and more specifically those in developing countries.  Also see Bhala (note 92 above) 1667 
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3 (3)’.398 In EC - Hormones the Appellate Body confirmed that options are equally available 
and there is no rule-exception relationship between them.399 As a consequence a Member will 
not be penalised for choosing the Article 3 (3) alternative for instance.400  
In a case where a Member chooses the Article 3 (3) option there is an obligation upon that 
member country to base its SPS measures on international standards where they exist, except 
as provided for in Article 3(3).401 The second option available to member countries under 
Article 3 (2) is more onerous than the ‘base on’ option available under Article 3 (1).402 It can 
be argued that the term ‘conform’ dictates a stricter standard upon Member countries as 
opposed to the term ‘base’. Further support for this assertion can be drawn from EC - 
Hormones wherein the Appellate Body interpreted a measure formulated under the Article 3 
(3) option as follows:  
‘…such a measure would embody the international standard completely and, for 
practical purposes, converts it into a municipal standard’. 403  
 
Thus, Article 3 (3) provides  that  SPS  measures  which ‘conform  to’  international  
standards  are presumed to be consistent with the SPS Agreement and the GATT 1994.404 
Lastly, the option, provided for in Article 3 (3) is important as it reflects the recognition of 
Member countries’ right to choose the level of protection they deem appropriate in their 
territories. It should however be noted that ‘the right of a Member to establish its own level of 
sanitary protection under Article 3 (3) of the SPS Agreement is an autonomous right and not 
an ‘exception’ from a ‘general obligation’ under Article 3 (3)’.405 More importantly, it should 
                                                          
398 Bossche et al (note 356 above) 42 
399 Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones para. 104. 
400 Ibid para. 102. 
401 The ‘international  standards’ contemplated in Article 3 (1) are  set by  international organisations,  such as 
the ‘3 Sisters’, the Codex  Alimentarius Commission with respect to food safety, the International Office of 
Epizootics, for animal health, and the Secretariat of  the  International Plant Protection Convention with respect 
to plant health. See Annex 3A (a), (b) & (c) of the SPS Agreement. For matters not covered by the three 
mentioned organisations, international standards within the meaning of Article 3 of the SPS Agreement may 
also be standards set by other relevant international organizations open for membership to all WTO Members,  
as  identified by the SPS Committee  (see Annex A, paragraph 3(d) of the SPS Agreement). Pursuant to Article 
3 (4) of the SPS Agreement, ‘Members have an obligation to participate in the work of the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission and the other organisations to the extent that their resources permit and to promote the 
development and periodic review of international standards’.  
402 Bossche et al (note 356 above) 42 
403 Appellate Body Report, EC – Hormones para. 170 
404 This presumption was held to be rebuttable by the Appellate Body in EC – Hormones. See Art 3 (2) SPS 
Agreement. 
405See (note 403 above) para. 172. 
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be noted that the right to choose measures that ‘deviate from international standards is not an 
‘absolute or unqualified right’.406 
Zarrilli, S notes minimizing distortions to international trade, as contemplated by the 
Agreement, is dependent upon the ‘efficiency and fairness of the international standard 
development process’.407 However, the process itself has problems of its own. It should be 
noted ‘the benefits of harmonization may be impeded if the process is captured by special 
interests in order to exclude other market participants or if it is not adequately transparent’.408 
Furthermore, the composition of the ‘three Sisters’ has been a subject of criticism by 
developing countries and other stakeholders.409 One of these criticisms relates to the inability 
of developing countries’ governments to sufficiently fund their delegates to attend SPS 
meetings.410 Moreover, developing countries protest that the standards promoted in SPS 
decisions lack their input and are dominated by the interests of developed countries.411  
Another problem that relates to the Agreement is that ‘it does not specify the procedures that 
international organizations should adhere to in order to produce genuine international 
standards’ in respect of matters not covered by the ‘three Sisters’.412 This has the undesirable 
effect of affording ‘standards developed by a limited number of countries or approved by a 
narrow majority of participants to assume the status of international standards’.413 Moreover, 
the process of international standard setting itself is becoming increasingly politicized which 
                                                          
406 There are two alternative conditions which deserve compliance as contemplated in Article 3.3, namely that:  
a) either  there must be a scientific justification for the SPS measure  
b) or the measure must be a result of the level of protection chosen by  the Member in accordance with 
Articles 5.1 through 5.8. (see ibid ) 
407 Zarrilli (note 345 above) 11 
408 OECD (1997) ‘Product standards, conformity assessment and regulatory reform’ TD/TC/WP (96)49/Rev2. 
409 WTO News ‘Committee agrees on treatment for developing countries’ WTO News Available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news03_e/sps_1_3apr03_e.htm ACCESSED ON 07 AUGUST 2014 
410 Ibid  
411‘Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures and Technical Barriers to Trade Summary’ available at 
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/issues/spstbt.html ACCESSED ON 07 AUGUST 2014 
Also see Zarrilli (note 345 above) 11-‘developing countries have repeatedly expressed their concern about the 
way in which international standards are developed and approved, pointing out how their own participation is 
very limited from the point of view of both numbers and effectiveness’. 
412 See Annex 3A SPS Agreement- for matters not covered by the 3 Sisters, standards developed by ‘other 
relevant international organizations open for membership to all Members’, as identified by the SPS Committee, 
are recognized. Also see Zarrilli (note 345 above) 12 
413 As a consequence of the inadequacy of the process ‘international standards are often inappropriate for use as 
a basis for domestic regulations in developing countries and these countries face problems when they have to 
meet regulations in the importing markets developed on the basis of international standards’. ibid 14 
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makes the adoption of standards more difficult especially for developing countries. 414 This 
has negative effects on the latter’s market access to developed countries. 
 
3.5.3 Equivalence (Art. 4) 
 
Whilst harmonization proves to be essential in the ‘establishment, recognition and application 
of common SPS measures by different member countries’415, there are conditions which may 
make it difficult or even undesirable to harmonise SPS measures.416 These differences in 
conditions, prompting a variety of SPS measures across countries, can and/or substantially 
hinder trade. However, the negative impact of divergent measures is not without a remedy.  
Bossche P and Prévost D note that, the impact can be limited by the ‘recognition that it is 
possible for different measures to achieve the same level of protection and consequently 
allow imports of products that comply with different, but equally effective, SPS measures’.417  
In this respect Article 4 of the SPS Agreement stipulates specific obligations for member 
countries in respect of the recognition of equivalence. Article 4 (1) of the SPS Agreement 
obliges member countries to accept different SPS measures as equivalent if the exporting 
member country objectively demonstrates to the importing member country that its measures 
achieve the latter’s appropriate level of protection (ALOP).418 It is for this purpose that, ‘the 
importing Member must, upon request, be given reasonable access to carry out inspections, 
tests and other relevant procedures’.419 In addition, Article 4 (2) obliges Members to enter 
into consultations, upon request, for purposes of concluding agreements on the recognition of 
equivalence.  
Despite equivalency being the best option when harmonization is not desirable or when 
international standards are inadequate and/or are inappropriate, the implementation of this 
principle thus far has been minimal.420 Zarrilli S notes that developing countries protest that 
developing countries are looking for ‘sameness’ instead of equivalency, of measures. As a 
consequence the interpretation of equivalency as sameness unjustifiably deprives Article 4 
(1) of its function namely ‘to recognize that different measures can achieve the same level of 
                                                          
414 Zarrilli (note 345 above) 14 
415Annex 2A SPS Agreement  
416 For examples of these factors see Bossche et al (note 356 above) 62 
417 Ibid 57  
418 Art 4 (1) SPS Agreement (Also see Annex 5A thereof) 
419 Ibid   
420 See Zarrilli (note 345 above) 17 
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SPS protection’.421 It should be noted that equivalency of SPS measures, to those applied by 
developing countries, can function as a  key instrument in enhancing market access for 
developing countries’ products.422 It is submitted that the failure to holistically apply the 
principle of equivalency as contemplated in the Agreement impedes market access between 
developing and developed countries.  
 
3.5.4 Risk Analysis Obligations (Art. 5)  
 
It is important to note that, ‘the national regulatory process by means of which SPS measures 
are imposed typically involves risk analysis’.423 Risk analysis comprises of risk assessment 
and risk management for purposes of the SPS Agreement.424 Risk assessment refers to ‘the 
scientific process of identifying the existence of a risk and establishing the likelihood that the 
risk may actually materialise according to the measures that could be applied to address the 
risk’.425 The second element of risk analysis, risk management by contrast, is a ‘policy-based 
process of determining the level of protection a country wants to achieve in its territory and 
choosing the measure that will be used to achieve that level of protection’.426 The distinction 
between the two elements in question is not absolute. As such scientific considerations also 
partially assume a pivotal role in risk assessment as well.  
 
3.5.4.1 Provisional measures and the precautionary principle (Art. 5) 
 
It has been shown thus far, that the SPS Agreement requires that all SPS measures to be 
‘based on’ science.427 It follows that the Agreement considers science as the touchstone 
against which SPS measures ought to be judged.428 However, absolute reliance on science 
suffers the setback that, ‘science does not have clear and unambiguous answers to all 
                                                          
421 Ibid  
422 Ibid ; Also see Bossche et al (note 356 above) 62 
423 Ibid Bossche et al 
424 Art 5 of SPS Agreement 
425 Bossche et al (note 356 above) 44 (Also see Annex 4A SPS Agreement) 
426 In risk management decision-making, ‘not only are the scientific results of the risk assessment taken into 
account but also societal value considerations  such as consumer preferences, industry interests, relative costs’. 
(See note 425 above) Cf see Bhala (note 92 above) 1668-the Agreement explicitly affirms the right of each 
government to choose its levels of protection including a ‘zero risk’ level if it so chooses. The Agreement 
‘imposes no requirement to establish a scientific basis for the chosen level of protection because the choice is 
not a scientific judgement but a societal value judgement’. 
427 Art 2 (2) SPS Agreement 
428 See Bossche et al (note 356 above) 35 
61 
 
regulatory problems’.429 A hypothetical situation to illustrate the aforementioned problem 
would be where a member country needs to act promptly and take measures to safeguard 
against possible harm regarding the existence and extent of the relevant risk in the absence of 
sufficient scientific evidence.430 In this case a Member country can act in accordance with the 
‘precautionary principle’. 
However, the use of the precautionary principle has its own shortfalls which can potentially 
lead to the abuse of the provision.431 In support of this assertion, Bossche P and Prévost D 
note that, ‘considerable differences of opinion exist between Members regarding the role that 
precaution plays in the regulatory process’.432 In spite of this assertion, it is undisputable that 
precaution is an inherent part of risk regulation. This is particularly the case in the sphere of 
health and environment.433 The aforegoing discussion prompts the need to determine the 
extent to which the SPS Agreement allows for precautionary measures as well as the 
requirements thereof. The Japan- Agricultural Products decision is instructive of the 
cumulative requirements for the adoption of provisional measures.434 It follows that the 
measure must:  
‘…be imposed in respect of a situation where relevant scientific information is 
insufficient; be adopted on the basis of available pertinent information; not be 
maintained unless the Member seeks to obtain the additional information necessary 
                                                          
429 Ibid  
430 Art. 5 (7) SPS Agreement provides that ‘in cases where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient, a Member 
may provisionally adopt sanitary or phytosanitary measures on the basis of available pertinent information, 
including that from the relevant international organizations as well as from sanitary or phytosanitary measures 
applied by other Members. In such circumstances, Members shall seek to obtain the additional information 
necessary for a more objective assessment of risk and review the sanitary or phytosanitary measure accordingly 
within a reasonable period of time’. 
431 The Japanese Variety testing case is illustrative of this problem. Japan’s restrictions against U.S. apple 
imports to prevent the introduction of the ‘fire blight’ plant disease, which affects plants but has no human 
health consequences, were found to be in violation of the SPS Agreement because of lack of scientific evidence 
to support such a measure. Japan defended the restrictions arguing they were provisional and precautionary and 
argued that their national authorities should be given deference in their interpretation of the scientific evidence. 
The WTO rejected this defense and ruled that objective assessment of the evidence should be the measure by 
which compliance with the WTO SPS measures will be determined. Without the deference to interpretation by 
national authorities, Japan’s precautionary were found to be clearly disproportionate to the risk. 
See (note 411 above) ACCESSED ON 07 AUGUST 2014 
432 Bossche et al (note 356 above) 57 
433 See Ibid- It is disputed ‘whether precaution should be taken into account in risk assessment or whether it only 
comes into play in risk management decisions.  There is also a difference of opinion as to whether precaution 
has emerged as a ‘principle’ in international law, or whether it is a mere ‘approach’ followed by countries’.  
434 Ibid  
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for a more objective assessment of risk; and be reviewed accordingly within a 
reasonable period of time’.435  
 
In essence these requirements flow from Article 5.7 of the Agreement.  
3.6 OTHER SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT 
 
Other substantive provisions of the SPS Agreement worth mentioning include adaptation to 
regional conditions, control, inspection and approval procedures and transparency and 
notification. 
3.6.1 Adaptation to regional conditions (Art. 6) 
 
It is important to note that ‘despite the fact that, traditionally an importing country applies its 
SPS measures to an exporting country as whole, differences in SPS conditions within 
exporting countries often exist’.436 Therefore, the failure of importing countries to recognize 
such inter-territory variations and accordingly adapt SPS measures to regional conditions 
may lead to the application of SPS measures that are excessively trade restrictive.437 Such a 
situation will be contrary to the SPS Agreement’s goal to promote international trade.  
In this respect the Agreement obliges member countries to ensure that their SPS measures are 
‘adapted to the SPS characteristics of the region of origin and destination of the product’.438 
However, developing countries have raised concerns in respect of this provision.439 One of 
the concerns is that, ‘the full benefits of regionalization, as provided for in Article 6, are not 
being realized due to difficulties implementing this provision’.440  
                                                          
435 Panel Report, Japan – Agricultural Products, para. 8.54; Appellate Body  Report, Japan –  
Agricultural Products, para. 89.   
436 Pest and disease prevalence is ‘independent of national boundaries and can differ within a specific country, 
due to variations in climate, environment, geographic conditions and regulatory systems in place to control or 
eradicate pests or diseases. The adaptation of SPS measures to the conditions prevailing in the region of origin 
of the product may thus be highly desirable’. For a further discussion see Bossche et al (note 356 above) 64-65. 
437 Ibid, 65. 
438 The characteristics in question must be determined with reference to, inter alia ‘the level of pest or disease 
prevalence; the existence of eradication or control programs; and guidelines developed by international 
organisations’. See Arts 6 (1) & 6(2) SPS Agreement. 
439 For a further discussion see Zarrilli (note 345 above) 21. 
440See (note 432 above) Also see Zarrilli (note 345 above) 21 for more discussion.  
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3.6.2 Transparency and notification (Art. 7 & Annex B) 
 
Another important provision that the Agreement envisages is that of transparency.441 There is 
a correlation between transparency and market access. It follows that, ‘the lack of 
transparency with regard to SPS measures may constitute a barrier to market access since it 
increases the cost and difficulty for exporters in determining what requirements their products 
must comply with on their export markets’.442 Article 7 of the Agreement addresses the issue 
in question by obliging member countries to notify interested member countries of changes in 
their SPS measures.443 It further requires member countries to provide information on their 
SPS measures in the manner contemplated in Annex B.444    
Article 5.8 also complements Article 7 by making a provision that promotes transparency. In 
this respect it obliges member countries to provide information, upon request, regarding the 
reasons for their SPS measures where such measures are not ‘based on’ international 
standards or no relevant international standards exist.445 It follows that a member country, 
which believes that a SPS measure does or could potentially restrain its exports, may request 
information under Article 5 (8).446 In the Japan-Apples dispute, the Panel had to decide 
whether certain changes in a Japan’s SPS related measure ‘may have a significant effect on 
trade of other Members’ and whether such member countries should thus, have been notified. 
The outcome of the dispute is instructive of the fact that, the determinant factor is ‘whether 
the changes in question have an actual or potential effect on the conditions for market 
access’.447 If the answer is in the affirmative, the member country proposing those changes 
must notify such changes to other member countries.448  This provision also has its own 
setbacks which negatively impact on the market access of developing countries.449  
                                                          
441 The principle of transparency is considered to be significantly important for trade by the WTO as it 
‘stabilises the trading environment’. It could be equally argued that it promotes market access and safeguards 
against protectionist policies. (For further discussion see WTO (note 14 above) ACCESSED ON 03 AUGUST 
2014 
442Bossche et al (note 356 above) 67 
443 Art 7 SPS Agreement 
444 Annex B contains ‘detailed rules ensuring publication of adopted SPS measures and prior notification of 
proposed SPS measures that differ from international standards, to allow time for comments from other 
Members. It also obliges Members to create the necessary infrastructure to carry out their transparency 
obligations through the establishment of a national Notification Authority and Enquiry Point’.  
445 Article 5 (8) SPS Agreement. Also see note 442 above) 
446 Ibid Bossche et al  
447 Panel Report, Japan-Apples, para. 8.314. 
448 Ibid  
449 See Zarrilli (note 345 above) 20-‘variations in the quality and content of the information provided by 
countries in their notifications, short comment periods, delays in responding to requests for documentation, 
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3.6.3 Control, inspection and approval procedures (Art. 8 & Annex C) 
 
Another significant provision of the Agreement is that which relates to control, inspection 
and approval procedures.450 These procedures exist to ensure that an importing country’s SPS 
requirements are complied with. However, if these procedures are complex, lengthy or costly, 
they may have the undesired effect of restricting market access.451 This result has serious 
negative implications for developing countries which often fail to meet these procedures due 
to limited technical resources.452 The Agreement purports to safeguard against related 
consequences through the vehicle of Article 8 as complemented by Annex C.453 The relevant 
provision, Article 8, makes it mandatory for member countries to comply with the disciplines 
contained in Annex C and the SPS Agreement collectively in the operation of their control, 
inspection and approval procedures.454  
 
3.6.4 Technical co-operation and Special and Differential Treatment (Article 9 &10) 
 
The Agreement also specifically makes provision for developing and less developed 
countries (LDCs) by affording them with technical co-operation and special and differential 
treatment (S&D).455 In respect of technical co-operation Zarrilli S argues that the Agreement 
was ‘negotiated and concluded with scant regard for the conditions necessary for its effective 
implementation, particularly in developing countries’.456 In terms of Article 9 (1), technical 
assistance contemplated could inter alia take the form of advice, credits, donations and 
grants. The purpose thereof would be ‘to allow developing countries to adjust to, and comply 
with, SPS measures necessary to achieve the ALOP in their export markets’.457  
It follows that the effective implementation of this provision would ‘create a more substantial 
type of policy coherence since it would enable developing countries to establish the necessary 
infrastructural and other conditions necessary for the effective implementation of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
absence, at times, of due consideration for the comments provided by other Members are recurrent problems 
limiting the effective implementation of the transparency provisions’. 
450 Art. 8 & Annex C SPS Agreement 
451 Bossche et al (note 356 above) 
452Consider Zarrilli (note 345 above) 21 
453 Art. 8 SPS Agreement 
454 Ibid (Also see Annex C thereof)-‘the disciplines in Annex C aim to ensure that procedures are not more 
lengthy and burdensome than is reasonable and necessary and do not discriminate against imports’. (Also see 
Bossche et al (note 356 above) 
455 Arts 9 & 10 SPS Agreement respectively  
456 Zarrilli (note 345 above) 21 
457 Art 9 (1) SPS Agreement 
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Agreement’.458 However, it should be noted that ‘technical co-operation and financial support 
are not a panacea and should not be used to replace the removal of unnecessary obstacles to 
trade’.459 In respect to the Agreement’s dedication to special and differential treatment (S&D) 
for developing countries and LDCs, it should be noted that the provisions of this article have 
not been converted into specific obligations.460 Consequently, ‘developing countries’ 
agricultural exports are often concentrated in a few products and in a few markets’.461 This 
exists as a setback to the Agreement’s enhancement of market access for developing 
countries. 
3.6.5 Institutional and Procedural Provisions of the SPS Agreement 
 
The SPS Agreement also has provisions that are dedicated for the implementation of the 
Agreement.  
3.6.5.1 SPS Committee (Art. 12) 
 
The SPS Committee, for instance, is established under Article 12 (1) of the SPS Agreement 
with a ‘mandate to carry out the functions necessary for the implementation of the SPS 
Agreement and the furtherance of its objectives’.462 The composition of the relevant 
committee includes the representatives of all WTO member countries and decisions are 
effected by way of consensus.463 
The Agreement outlines the three main tasks of the SPS Committee.  Firstly, the Committee 
functions as a forum for consultations. It follows that the Committee must encourage and 
facilitate consultations or negotiations between member countries on SPS issues under the 
auspices of Article 12 (2). Secondly, according to Article 12 (2), the SPS Committee must 
encourage the use of international standards by Member countries.464 Thirdly, the SPS 
Committee also has an obligation to undertake a triennial review of the operation and 
implementation of the SPS Agreement.465  
                                                          
458 Zarrilli (note 345 above) 24 
459 Ibid  
460 Ibid  
461 Ibid 23 
462 Art 12 (1)SPS Agreement 
463 Ibid  
464 The SPS Committee is obliged by Article 12 (3) ‘to maintain close contact with the international standard-
setting organisations, and must develop a procedure for the monitoring of the process of international 
harmonisation in terms of Article 12 (4)’.See Bossche et al (note 356 above) 70 
465 Art 12 (8) of the SPS Agreement-this obligation applied three years after the Agreement’s entry into force 
and as necessary thereafter.  
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3.6.5.2 Dispute settlement (Art. 11) 
 
The provisions of Articles XXII and XXIII of the GATT 1994, as elaborated by the Dispute 
Settlement of Understanding Agreement (DSU), apply to consultations and the settlement of 
disputes under the SPS Agreement, except as otherwise provided.466 The SPS Agreement 
contains only one ‘special or additional rule and procedure’.467 The SPS Agreement 
authorises panels to consult experts to assist them in dealing with complex issues related to 
SPS disputes that turn on scientific facts.468 These experts in question are selected by the 
panel in consultation with the parties. Furthermore Panels may also organize advisory 
technical expert groups or consult relevant international organisations.469 This may be done at 
the request of either party to the dispute at the Panel’s own initiative or discretion. The 
importance of consultations with experts can be seen on the reliance of the WTO Panels on 
individual experts in most disputes with scientific issues.470  
3.7 CONCLUSION 
 
The critical analysis undertaken by this thesis thus far has raised a number of issues and 
concerns that relate to the market access of developing countries into developed countries. 
Firstly, this chapter had to critically analyse the extent to which SPS measures impede trade 
between developing countries and developed countries. It is evident from the analysis that 
SPS measures generally impede trade amongst countries and particularly developing 
countries. The support for this assertion can be drawn from the difficulties that SPS measures 
in general impose on developing countries. Furthermore, it can be argued that SPS measures 
have the potential to be used to impede trade as observed by the disputes namely the EC-
Hormones case. Moreover, they can impede trade since they have the potential to be 
improperly applied without due consideration of the relevant rules. Consequently, this 
problem hinders the market access of developing countries into developed countries’ markets. 
Another significant point raised was the susceptible nature of SPS measures which may result 
in their use as domestic protectionist tools.  
                                                          
466 Ibid Art 11 (1) 
467 See Appendix 2 of the Dispute Settlement of Understanding Agreement; Bossche et al (note 356 above) 71. 
Note that-‘special or additional dispute settlement rules and procedures prevail over the rules and procedures of 
the DSU to the extent that they differ’ (Also see Article 1 (2) of the DSU). 
468 Article 11.7 of the SPS Agreement 
469 Ibid  
470 Bossche et al (note 356 above) 71 who note that ‘in all SPS disputes to date, panels have consulted individual 
experts to help them to understand the complex issues of scientific fact that arose in these disputes’. Also see EC 
– Hormones, Australia – Salmon, Japan – Agricultural Products II and Japan – Apples.  
67 
 
The resultant effect is that producers in developing countries struggle to export their products 
in markets that they previously exported into. For other developing countries the effect is that 
they struggle to penetrate developed countries markets. As such SPS measures in general can 
act as obstacles to effective trade. It was also shown that developed countries have a 
monopoly on the use of SPS measures which makes developing countries the victims in the 
whole economic transaction. SPS measures were shown to have major negative implications 
especially in the agricultural sector. It follows that developing countries experience more 
economic backlashes as a result of the unjustified use of SPS measures. This is due to the fact 
that agriculture exists as the backbone of developing countries’ economies. It can be 
concluded from the aforegoing that SPS measures impede trade between developing 
countries and developed countries. 
However, it should be noted that on the other hand SPS measures may be adopted for 
legitimate reasons namely for the protection of human, animal or plant life or health. This 
purpose is outlined in the objectives of the SPS Agreement which was put in place to regulate 
the adoption and implementation of SPS measures. In this respect the Agreement 
counterbalances the member countries sovereign right to adopt and maintain SPS measures 
with the need to promote international trade. This is achieved through subjecting the ‘right’ in 
question to certain limitations namely earmarking ‘science as the touchstone against which 
SPS measures must be judged’.471 In this respect this chapter also had to critically determine 
the extent to which the SPS Agreement has been effective in enhancing market access for 
developing countries. It was argued that developing countries face major problems in the 
implementation and application of the SPS Agreement. It was shown that developing 
countries fail to effectively participate in the international standard-setting process and in 
essence they take issue with the Agreement based on the reasoning that standard-setting was 
until recently the exclusive domain of developed countries. As a consequence developing 
countries face insurmountable difficulties when requested to meet SPS measures in foreign 
markets. This problem is exacerbated by lack of adequate infrastructure and requisite experts 
in complying with SPS measures imposed by developed countries. The existence of such a 
problem makes the provisions ‘S&D’ and technical co-operation irrelevant. Moreover, the 
                                                          
471 See ibid, Bossche et al -These scientific requirements are further elaborated on, in Article 5 (1) which 
provides that ‘SPS measures must be based on a risk assessment’. 
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‘S&D’ provisions remain rather theoretical and apparently have not materialized in any 
concrete step in favour of developing countries.472  
In respect of technical cooperation it was highlighted the provisions thereof, have not been 
converted into specific obligations.473 It was argued that, this has the effect of concentrating 
products of developing countries in a few markets, which defeats the essence of international 
trade. The SPS Agreement’s provisions on transparency and adaptation to regional conditions 
also pose a serious burden for developing countries since they fail to benefit from these 
provisions due to inadequate and requisite infrastructure or resources. Ultimately, as has been 
indicated by this chapter, the existence of the abovementioned problems, inter alia, has the 
undesired effect of impeding market access for developing countries. Thus, one could come 
to the conclusion that the SPS Agreement has not been effective in enhancing market access 
for developing countries to a larger extent.  This may be due to lack of clarity in respect of 
certain provisions  
The next chapter will be dedicated to critically analysing the impact of SPS measures on 
market access for particular developing countries such as Kenya and South Africa and their 
specific trading relationship with the European Union. More specifically it will outline the 
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CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF SPS MEASURES ON MARKET 





The previous chapter, was dedicated towards critically assessing the extent to which SPS 
measures can impede trade between developing and developed countries and it also came to  
the conclusion that ( based on the facts provided); SPS measures impede trade to a larger 
extent. Consequently, SPS measures can act as trade barriers or obstacles to market access for 
developing countries in one or two of the following ways. Firstly, when an exporting 
developing country is unable to comply with certain conditions or standards imposed by 
developed countries.474 Secondly, SPS measures can impede market access for developing 
countries when an importing country imposes arbitrary regulations which are not based on 
science as required by the SPS Agreement.475  
The aforegoing suggests that, there is an intimate correlation between the implementation of 
SPS measures by developed countries and the access of developing countries into developed 
countries’ markets. Market access is defined by the World Bank as a foreign producer’s 
ability to sell in a given country.476 In the WTO context, ‘market access’ is premised on both 
obligations and rights.477 For example in the South African context SA’s obligation as a 
WTO member is to provide market access to other Member countries in return for her ‘right’ 
of access to other Member countries’ markets for SA’s goods on multilaterally agreed terms. 
                                                          
474 A Ogambi ‘The Small farmer on the Way to the Global Market: The case of Kenya’ (2006) Agriculture and 
Rural development 1, 13 
475 Article 2 (2) SPS Agreement-As highlighted in the previous chapter Article 2 (2) envisages both the 
necessity requirement as well the scientific basis requirement namely the need to base any SPS measure on 
science. 
476 See IMF & World Bank (2002) ‘Market Access for Developing Country Exports- Selected Issues’ Joint Staff 
Paper; Also see E Ronge ‘Implications of an EPA for Kenya’s agricultural market access in the European 
Union’ (2006) 6 IEA Research Paper Series 32 
477 The FAO Resource Manual on Agreement on Agriculture provides introductory analysis of various market 
access provisions. See the chapters by Elamin (2000), Pearce and Sharma (2000), Sharma (2000a) and Sharma 
(2000b), available at www.fao.org/trade ACCESSED 22 JUNE 2014 
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It follows that a balanced analysis of market access provisions envisages both obligations and 
rights.478 
It should be noted that ‘the ability of developing countries to maintain and/ or expand their 
world trade market share is dependent upon their ability to meet the demands of the world 
trading system’.479 For the purposes of this thesis the demands contemplated above include 
meeting and complying with quality and safety standards. An example is that of, SPS 
measures which have been shown to have the detrimental impact of impeding trade between 
developing countries and developed countries.480 The problem projected above impedes the 
expansion of developing countries in global trade.  This chapter will be committed towards 
determining the extent to which SPS measures have impeded market access of South Africa 
and Kenya in respect of agricultural products, as case examples of developing countries. 
Thus, the chapter will commence the discussion by providing a background to the trading 
relationship between South Africa and Kenya with the European Union (EU), followed by 
critically analysing the implications of EU SPS requirements on South Africa and Kenya and 
finally, critically discussing the problems currently being faced by the developing countries 
in question, in accessing EU markets. 
4.2 BACKGROUND  
 
There exists evidence suggesting that the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) yielded notable 
improvements in the developing countries’ market access to developed country markets.481 
This was achieved by the process of tarrification.482 On the other hand such a development 
consequently led to the proliferation in the use of SPS measures and other non-tariff barriers 
(NTBs). Henson S and Loader R argue that with the liberalization of traditional tariffs and 
quantitative restrictions on agricultural and food products technical measures have become 
popular.483 The problem associated with the increasing popularity of technical measures is 
                                                          
478 P Krishna, K Yogendra, RP Pradyumna (2009) 41‘Agreement on agriculture: Market Access’ available at 
ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/008/ae896e/ae896e03.pdf ACCESSED ON 23 MAY 2014 
479 See Henson & Loader (note 1 above) 87 
480 This issue was dealt with under Chapter 3 of this thesis wherein it was concluded that SPS measures 
generally impede trade between countries particularly developing and developed countries.  
481 Henson & Loader (note 1 above) 87- under the process of ‘tarrification’ all countries were obliged to 
eliminate all their non-tariff barriers namely import bans, import quotas or quantitative restrictions on imports 
inter alia and convert these to tariffs. This had the effect of enhancing market access for developing countries. 
See A Glipo ‘The WTO-AoA: Impact on Farmers and Rural Women in Asia’ Advocacy paper prepared for the 
2003 WTO Ministerial meeting 2003, 1 
482 WTO (note 14 above) ACCESSED ON 26 OCTOBER 2014 for an understanding of the process of 
tarrification under the WTO Agreement on Agriculture 
483Henson & Loader (note 1 above) 87 
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that they ‘can impede trade in the same manner as traditional barriers and quantitative 
restrictions’.484 In some instances NTBs have been dubbed to be more trade restrictive than 
traditional tariffs. 485 It should be further noted that in the case of agricultural and food 
exports in particular, ‘compliance with technical requirements such as SPS measures is a 
prerequisite for successful export trade’.486  
It follows that if compliance with the measures contemplated above is a prerequisite for 
successful export trade, developing countries’ market access may be hindered or limited. The 
reasoning for this, as argued in the previous chapter, is that developing countries lack the 
requisite or adequate technical infrastructure needed to comply with developed countries’ 
SPS requirements.487 Recent studies suggest that SPS measures are considered to be the most 
significant impediment to exports to the European Union (EU).488 This is premised on the 
fact that the EU has been dubbed as the leading developing country in the use of SPS 
measures.489 One reason proffered for the former evidence, is the assertion that the EU’s 
enforcement of SPS measures is process based490 and such a process is considered by 
developing countries as more onerous.491 This makes it particularly difficult for developing 
countries to comply with SPS measures involving such a method. 
To date, SPS measures are increasingly becoming impediments to market access for 
developing countries for a number of reasons including lack of compliance resources, 
financial constraints and lack of technical and/ or scientific expertise.492 These constraints 
result in most developing countries’ failure to comply with developed countries’ SPS 
requirements within the prescribed time or at an exorbitantly high cost in cases where 
compliance is adhered to. These problems and other issues will be dealt with in the course of 
                                                          
484 S Laird & A Yeats ‘Trends in non-tariff barriers of developed countries’ (1990)126 Weltwirtschaflitches. 
299, 299 For statistics to support the assertion, see Henson & Loader (note 1 above) 88 
485 Athukorala & Jayasuriya (note 35 above) 1 
486 Horton (note 322 above) 
487 See K Murphy & A Shleifer ‘Quality and Trade’ (1997) 53 Journal of development economics 1,1- 
‘theoretical work has demonstrated that developing countries find it difficult to trade with developed countries 
due to differences in quality requirements’. 
488 Henson & Loader (note 1 above) 91-92 
489 See ibid 
490 Process-based controls are enforced by a ‘competent authority’ within the exporting country as opposed to 
border inspection. In essence this implies that exporters have to comply with SPS requirements during all the 
processes preceding exportation of the agricultural products. Due to the multiplicity of these processes 
developing countries usually struggle with undertaking them. See ‘WTO Agreement on SPS measures’ available 
at http://projects.nri.org/nret/PWB/WTO.htm ACCESSED ON 20 NOVEMBER 2014 
491 Henson & Loader (note 1 above) 
492Y Gebrehiwet, S, Ngqangweni & JF Kirsten ‘Quantifying the trade effect of  SPS regulations of OECD 
Countries on South African Food Exports’ (2007) 46 Agrekon 1, 23 
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critically assessing the impact of SPS measures on market access for developing countries in 
the context of South Africa and Kenya. 
 
4.3 CASE STUDY OF SOUTH AFRICA (SA) AND THE EU 
4.3.1 Background  
 
South Africa’s main export destination for citrus fruit is the EU, which constitutes up to 65% 
of all South African citrus fruits export destination.493  The most prominent and current 
example of the use of SPS measures on South Africa relates to the Citrus Black Spot 
(CBS)494 standard established by the EU and the USA which had the effect of banning citrus 
exports from South Africa. The result of this ban was the loss of export revenue and 
increased costs of compliance which translated into reduction in market access for SA to the 
EU due to compliance failure and/or constraints.495 
Consequently, the SA citrus exporters had to ‘comply with either the requirements of Hazard 
Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP) or its similar component namely Integrated Crop 
Management (ICM)’.496 One issue that is noteworthy is that the central focus of ICM, inter 
alia, entails ‘environmental management, responsible agricultural practices and socio 
aspects’. It should, however be noted that SPS measures, in order to qualify as such, should 
be aimed at the protection of human or animal life or health from food-borne risks or pests 
and/or  diseases.497 Based on such, ICM compliance does not fall within the ambit of SPS 
measures as contemplated by the SPS Agreement. 
Apart from these requirements SA citrus exporters are now confronted with the requirement 
to conform to the European retailers Produce on Good Agricultural Practice (EUREPGAP) 
Protocol.498 This particular requirement presents a major challenge for citrus exporters as it 
includes issues that are not related to the maintenance of the quality of the citrus.499 This 
                                                          
493 Y Gebrehiwet Quantifying the trade effect of SPS regulations of OECD Countries on South African Food 
Exports (Unpublished Agricultural Economics thesis, University of Pretoria, 2004) 61 
494 This will be dealt with later in the chapter  
495 Gebrehiwet (note 493 above) 61 
496 Gebrehiwet et al (note 492 above) 23 
497 Annex 1A (a) - (d) SPS Agreement 
498 The UREPGAP is now commonly known as Global Partnership for Good Agricultural Practice 
(GLOBALGAP) as of 2007 and is a ‘pre-farm-gate standard, which means that the certificate covers the process 
of the certified product from before the seed is planted until it leaves the farm’ available at 
http://www.intracen.org/uploadedFiles/intracenorg/Content/Exporters/Exporting_Better/Quality_Management/R
edesign/EQB81_SPS_eng_October%202007_5_final.pdf ACCESSED ON 31 OCTOBER 2014 
499 See (note 495 above) 
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requirement, like its counterpart the ICM, is not justifiable under the SPS Agreement. Apart 
from lacking justification under the SPS Agreement EUREPGAP imposes further 
requirements which pose compliance problems to SA exporters due to high costs associated 
with it. These include, inter alia, the requirement to prepare washing facilities and portable 
toilets every 600 metres in the orchard.500  
Compliance with the two tier certification system (EUREPGAP and HACCP) exists as a 
precondition for successful export trade of SA’s citrus fruits and subsequently SA’s market 
access in the EU. However, due to the exorbitant costs of compliance, the SA’s access into 
the EU market is unduly restricted. Of alarming significance is the fact that the risk analysis 
undertaken by experts in relation to CBS highlights that CBS cannot spread to the EU region 
since, by the time the fruit exported to the EU reaches the EU the climatic conditions 
prevalent will be unfavourable for the disease to germinate.501 Of relevance is that, the SPS 
Agreement requires SPS measures to ‘be only applied to the extent necessary to protect 
human, animal or plant life or health … and be based on science’.502   
According to Cook L ‘since 1925 when citrus were exported to the EU there has never been 
an incidence of CBS in the European orchards’.503 In light of this, the recurring bans based on 
EU SPS measures appear to be a disguised means of protection without a scientific 
justification as required by Article 2 of the SPS Agreement. It has also been argued that the 
EU sets SPS regulations or standards that are more stringent than those set by the CODEX 
Alimentarius.504 The CODEX is responsible for ‘setting standards to ensure the safety of 
consumers and circumvent the use of standards as protectionist tools’.505 According to the 
SPS Agreement all SPS standards ought to be based on science and international standards 
subject to certain exceptions namely Article 5 (7) of the Agreement.506 
 
                                                          
500 A Jooste, E Kruger. & F Kotze ‘Standards and trade in South Africa: Paving pathways for increased market 
access and competitiveness’ in JS Wilson. & VO Abiola (eds) Standards and Global Trade: A voice for Africa. 
(2003) 235, 370 
501 SADC (2000) Country Paper: South Africa- Paper presented at the SADC Conference on SPS/Food Safety 
held in Windhoek, Namibia. 
502 Arts 2 (1) SPS Agreement 
503 L Cook ‘SA Citrus Growers Blame Spain for Ban’ Business Day Newspaper 2002 available at 
http://allafrica.com/publishers.html ACCESSSED ON 26 OCTOBER 2014 
504 Henson & Loader (note 1 above) 91 
505 Ibid  
506 See Arts 2 (2), Article 3 & 5 (7) SPS Agreement. 
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4.4. SOUTH AFRICAN CITRUS CASE 
 
The impact of the SPS measures as used by the EU on the ability of developing countries to 
access its market is evident in the 2013 ban of SA citrus exports to the EU.507  The ban was 
prompted by several interceptions, by the EU, of citrus imports from South Africa infested by 
the CBS which is a fungal plant disease that, although harmless to humans, can damage 
quality and quantity of citrus cultivation.508  In 2013 the ban was likely to have virtually no 
impact on trade as it exclusively applied to imports harvested over the period 2012-2013. 
There existed threats from the EU to extend the ban should the risk of spreading persist.509 
The South African government strongly opposed closure of EU borders to its exports for lack 
of conclusive scientific evidence as to the likelihood of the fungus spreading from picked 
fruit.510 Such a ban based on SPS measures which has the effect of impeding South Africa’s 
access into the European markets reflects a greater problem that is also affecting the greater 
part of other developing countries.511  
The 2013 CBS based ban which was lifted earlier this year led the EU to introduce new 
regulations with the purpose of safeguarding the spread of CBS to the EU.512 However, the 
CBS 2013 ban raises concerns in respect of SA Citrus exporters’ market access into the EU 
following the threats of market closure. These EU regulations unjustifiably limit the market 
access for SA to the EU since the CBS fungal disease carries no health hazards to consumers 
or non-infected orchards as contemplated by the SPS Agreement.513 The SPS Agreement 
stipulates that an SPS regulation should be set up by a Member country to protect human or 
animal life or health from food-borne risks or pests and/or diseases.514 Moreover, for some 
                                                          
507 C Dunmore ‘EU bans South African citrus imports over disease fears’ Reuters 28 November 2013 available 
at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/28/us-eu-southafrica-citrus-idUSBRE9AR0E920131128 ACCESSED  
ON 31 MARCH 2014 
508 Ibid  
509 Ibid  
510 F Montanari ‘EU to adopt and review SPS measures’ available at http://foodlawlatest.com/2013/12/17/eu-to-
adopt-and-review-sps-measures/ ACCESSED ON 31 MARCH 2014 
511 The affected developing countries include the ACP (African Caribbean and Pacific) countries which have a 
longstanding trading relationship with the EU. See D Prévost ‘Sanitary, Phytosanitary and Technical Barriers to 
Trade in the Economic Partnership Agreements between the European Union and the ACP Countries’ (2010) 
(ICTSD) Working paper series 6. 
512J Shanon ‘Blackspot fears squeeze citrus fruits’ Bdlive 09 July 2013 available at 
http://www.bdlive.co.za/business/agriculture/2013/07/09/black-spot-fears-squeeze-citrus-exports# ACCESSED 
ON 27 OCTOBER 2014 
513 Recent studies by South African and USA experts confirm that ‘the fruit itself cannot transmit the disease but 
the citrus trees can’. These studies further support the assertion that the EU regulations were not based on 
science. South Africa is only exporting the citrus fruit and not the trees. See ibid.  
514 Annex 1A (a) - (d) SPS Agreement 
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SA citrus exporters these EU regulations are impossible515 to meet yet the EU mandates 
compliance despite the regulations’ lack of a scientific basis. According to Chadwick, the 
EU’s regulations are motivated by ‘protectionism rather than by phytosanitary concerns’.516 
The regulations are alleged to serve the purpose of protecting citrus industries of Spain, Italy 
and Greece.517 Hannes de Waal argues that whereas such a trade dispute could end up before 
the WTO DSU there have been suggestions that ‘it is difficult to win wars with trading 
partners’.518 
In light of this case CBS experts have confirmed that ‘CBS is not a risk and a ban would be 
thus unnecessary’ since the fungal disease poses no threat to human, plant or animal health.519 
In a draft scientific opinion published by the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) it was 
concluded that the chances of CBS affecting the EU were ‘moderately likely’.520 However, 
this opinion was criticised by CBS experts as being full of ‘factual errors and omissions 
owing to the fact that there is no recorded case of the disease ever having spread via fruit 
exports’.521 According to a recent EFSA scientific report on the risk of CBS there is a high 
level of uncertainty due to a lack of knowledge over how the disease would respond to the 
EU climate.522 The EFSA report reasoned that considering that eradication and containment 
of CBS are difficult, SPS measures should focus on preventing entry.523 Such an opinion 
points towards the exclusion of SA citrus exports from the EU market. This is particularly 
problematic since these EU SPS regulations negatively impact on the market access of SA (in 
particular) into the EU.  
Following the temporary ban instituted against the SA citrus exports and its lifting in May 
2014 stricter plant safety rules have been implemented against South African citrus.524 The 
reason why a potential ban will negatively impact SA’s market access is that the EU is South 
                                                          
515 These regulations were identified earlier see (note 504 above)  
516 See (note 512 above) 
517 Ibid  
518 Ibid -It can be argued that the pessimism of SA in approaching the DSU lies in their desire to maintain 
trading relations with the EU. As highlighted earlier the EU is the major SA citrus exports’ destination and 
fighting with such a trading partner will have major economic repercussions on SA.  
519 See (note 507 above ) ACCESSED ON 27 OCTOBER 2014  
520EFSA Panel on Plant Health ‘Scientific opinion on a pest risk assessment and additional evidence provided 
by South Africa on Guignardia citricarpa Kiely, citrus black spot fungus (CBS)’ (2008) 925 The EFSA Journal 
available at http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/efsajournal/doc/925.pdf ACCESSED ON 27 OCTOBER 2014 
521 See (note 512 above) 
522 SAM Perryman & JS West ‘External Scientific Report : Splash dispersal of Phyllosticta citricarpa conidia 
from infected citrus fruit’ 2014 UK EFSA Journal 1, 174 
523 Ibid  
524 African resource Network ‘EU rules against SA citrus ban, imposes stricter import criteria’ available at 
http://afresnet.mbendi.com/a_sndmsg/news_view.asp?I=151200&PG=16 ACCESSED ON 27 OCTOBER 2014 
76 
 
Africa’s and the industry’s largest trading partner. Minister Rob Davies 525 argues that the 
current SPS measures based on the EFSA 2014 report are ‘not driven by EU’s desire to limit 
access to the EU market for plant safety measures but, protectionist desires’.526 In support of 
this, according to a media statement issued by the Department of Agriculture, forestry and 
fisheries, ‘the fungal disease only affects the cosmetic appearance of the citrus fruit but has 
no impact on the citrus’ safety or the quality of its flesh’.527 
The current EU-EFSA regulations can be challenged on a number of grounds.  
Firstly, the ‘scientific values used by EFSA are questionable… its criteria to assess 
the risk for entry, spread and establishment of a disease are very likely, likely and 
very unlikely, but never no risk’. Secondly, ‘South Africa is not the only country with 
black-spot issues, yet the EU focuses on South Africa, perhaps because it is the main 
competition for Spanish producers, whose season overlaps with that of South Africa. 
There are reasonable grounds for discrimination as contemplated by the SPS 
Agreement’. Lastly ‘in terms of WTO rules, countries have to try to ‘regionalise’ their 
trade restrictions. If the scientific assessment shows there is a risk of spread or 
establishment in a certain region, but not in others, there is no justification for 
introducing trade restrictions in all the regions’.528 
 
As of September 2014 the vast majority of SA Citrus growers voluntarily ceased exporting 
citrus fruits to the EU.529 The cessation of this nature was prompted by the EU Citrus 
Growers association’s notification of the SA Department of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries to put in place a permanent ban if another consignment530 of CBS infected fruit was 
                                                          
525 Davies Rob is the current South African Minister of Trade and Industry 
526 A Visser ‘Citrus black spot still haunts local industry’ Bdlive 24 July 2014 available at 
http://www.bdlive.co.za/business/trade/2014/07/24/citrus-black-spot-still-haunts-local-industry ACCESSED 
ON 27 OCTOBER 2014. 
527 Media Release ‘Reports of the European Commission’s decision to lift the ban on the importation of South 
African Fruits’ 2 May 2014 available at http://www.nationaljournal.com/library/147699 ACCESSED ON 27 
OCTOBER 2014 
528 Visser (note 526 above) -This furthers the challenge against the EU-EFSA regulations on the basis that they 
are justifiable as contemplated by the SPS Agreement. It can be argued that these regulations are arbitrary.  
529 P Vecchiatto ‘SA citrus growers halt fruit exports to EU’ Bdlive 08 August 2014 available at 
http://www.bdlive.co.za/business/trade/2014/09/08/sa-citrus-growers-halt-fruit-exports-to-eu  ACCESSED ON 
27 OCTOBER 2014 
530 Consignment is defined by the SA Plant Health (Phytosanitary) Bill 2013 as a quantity of plants, plant 
products or other regulated articles being moved from or to the Republic and covered, when required, by a 
single phytosanitary certificate. 
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found.531 As highlighted earlier, evidence suggests that the EU’s current regulations are not 
based on science as required by the SPS Agreement.532 The current situation is particularly 
problematic for the SA Citrus exporters as they had gone to great lengths and cost to ensure 
compliance with EU requirements namely new testing regimes and a comprehensive CBS 
risk management programme. More concerning is the fact that despite the efforts rendered by 
SA to deal with EU’s regulations no agreement has been reached with the EU since 1992 on 
the risk of CBS’ transmission to EU citrus orchards via fruit exports.533 Inasmuch as the 
current ban is voluntary this does not in any way positively impact on SA’s market access to 
the EU. It could be further argued that such a decision by the SA citrus growers is merely a 
compromise to maintain the possibility of future market access into the EU. 
 
4.5 CASE STUDY OF KENYA AND THE EU 
4.5.1 Background 
 
The trading relationship between Kenya and the EU dates as back as 1975 when 
approximately 71 countries, including Kenya, from the African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
signed a trade agreement with the EU, known as the Lome Convention.534 The Convention, 
inter alia provisions relating to future trade and aid relations, provided for the granting of 
non-reciprocal trade preferences in respect of the ACP products destined to the EU market.535 
In essence it afforded the ACP countries free market access into the EU market.536 Upon its 
expiry in February 2000, the Lome IV Convention was replaced by the Cotonou Partnership 
Agreement (CPA).537 Under the CPA, ACP countries were mandated to reciprocate the duty 
                                                          
531 P.A.A.M. ‘SA citrus growers halt fruit exports to EU’ available at 
http://www.paaam.net/news_articles/view_story/1242 ACCESSED ON 27 OCTOBER 2014  
532 Art. 2 (2) SPS Agreement  
533 Vecchiatto (note 529 above) Also see (note 527 above) SA has been disputing the scientific basis of EU’s 
phytosanitary measures in relation to CBS for a number of years. 
534 Ronge (note 476 above) 1 
535 Art 167 (1) – (2) of the Lome Convention (1975) provided that ‘… the object of this Convention is to 
promote trade between the ACP States and the EU…paying particular regard to securing effective additional 
advantages for ACP States’ trade with the EU, and to improving the conditions of access for their products to 
the market in order to accelerate the growth of their trade and in particular, of the flow of their exports to the 
Community’. 
536 I.E.A (2000) .The Point .Institute of economic Affairs, Nairobi 
537 In comparison to its predecessor, the Lome Convention, the CPA  had the broader objective of  ‘… fostering 
the smooth and gradual integration of the ACP states into the world economy thereby promoting their 
sustainable development and contributing to poverty eradication in the ACP states’. See Article 34 (1) of the 
Cotonou Partnership Agreement (2000).  Also see Articles 34(2) and (3) which outline the Agreement’s the 
broader objective of  ‘enhancing the production, supply and trading capacity of the ACP countries as well as 
their capacity to attract investment by creating new trade dynamics between the parties with a view to facilitate 
their transition to the liberalised global economy’.  
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free access to the EU as from 2008.538 Consequently, ACP countries would have to sign 
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with the EU in their respective regional 
groupings.539  
In overall Kenyan agricultural exports face four major challenges related to the EU SPS 
requirements. These include adherence to maximum residue levels (MRLs), conformity to 
quality standards540, traceability directives and the EUREPGAP requirements.541 It will be 
shown that though Kenya enjoyed duty free market access into the EU under the ACP- EU 
CPA the emergence of the EU SPS requirements stipulated above acted as substantial barriers 
to Kenyan market access to the EU.542 
 
4.5.2 EU-KENYAN FISH IMPORTS BAN CASE 
 
Another case study that focuses on how SPS measures can impede the ability of developing 
countries to access markets of developed countries is that of Kenya and the EU. Noor H543, 
points out that ‘two issues arise from the latest experiences of the fishing sector of Kenya.’ 
He further argues that these issues ‘may serve as a salutary lesson’ and that they are 
indicative of the problems which the SPS measures raise or are likely to raise in the future.544  
One issue is that of the ‘knee-jerk reaction of the EU to the Cholera outbreak in 1997 by the 
imposition of a ban instead of the acceptable formula advised by the World Health 
                                                          
538 Such a change was majorly prompted by the application of the MFN principle which obliges each WTO 
Member country to treat all other WTO members in the same manner as it treats its most-favoured trading 
partner. The Lome IV Convention was allegedly in violation of this principle. 
539 Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) are ‘development-focused’ reciprocal trade agreements negotiated 
between the ACP countries/regions and the EU. The balance of the Agreements is such that EU as one regional 
block, provides full duty free and quota free market access to EPA countries and/or regions whilst ACP 
countries/ regions, commit to open at least 75% of their markets to the EU. For EPAs see Article 36 (2) of the 
CPA which stipulates that ‘the Parties agree that the new trading arrangements shall be introduced gradually…’ 
540 The Conformity to Quality Standards (Directive No EC 1148/2001) requires that ‘in addition to a 
phytosanitary certificate, a certificate of conformity be issued after a conformity check has been undertaken for 
each exported consignment by official inspection bodies’. The other requirements will be addressed in the 
course of this Chapter. 
541 K.I.P.P.R.A. ‘Assessment of the Potential Impact of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) on the 
Kenyan Economy’. Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis Unpublished mimeograph (2005). 
542 OJ Odeko (2003) ‘East Africa’s Agricultural Interests: A defensive and Offensive Strategy with 
Regard to EU-CAP reform’ Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Nairobi. However, Kenya no longer enjoys the benefits of 
ACP-EU CPA due its non-ratification of the ACP- EPAs, as contemplated by Article 36 (2) of the CPA of 2000 
which was due to expire on the 1st of October 2014. This will remain the case until Kenya ratifies an Economic 
Partnership Agreement with the EU. 
543 H Noor (2000) ‘Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures and their Impact on Kenya’ EconNews Africa available 
at http://www.oceandocs.net/handle/1834/386 ACCESSED ON 20 NVEMBER 2014 
544 Ibid.  
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Organisation (WHO), with the consequential damage to Kenya’s export earnings’.545 This 
occurrence is sufficient proof that ‘much needs to be done to protect exporting developing 
countries which are at the mercy of the whim of importing developed countries’.546 The 
second issue is that ‘what had twenty months ago started out as a scare story in an adverse 
report about illegal fishing by the use of chemicals at Lake Victoria culminated in a ban 
(instead of a more acceptable remedy- use of Good Hygiene Practices) which was to be lifted 
only after certification that fish from the lake were free from pesticide residues’.547 This is 
reflective of how SPS measures can be disguised by developed countries as a protectionist 
measure resulting in problems in market access.  
The EU has over time imposed several bans on the fish exports from Lake Victoria which 
was the main source of fisheries for Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania.548 It should however, be 
noted that whereas some of the bans might have been motivated by legitimate SPS concerns 
the overall effect was the limitation of market access into the EU. This thesis will focus on 
the bans that affected Kenya in particular due to the use EU SPS measures. The first 
controversial case involving such a ban occurred in April 1997 and was imposed on the basis 
of the presence of salmonellae in Lake Victoria. This ban is reflective of how developed 
countries have used and continue to use SPS standards that adversely affect the capacity of 
developing countries to comply with them. This is due to the complex nature of the 
requirements549 and the absence of requisite infrastructure in developing countries.550 The 
second ban on Kenyan fish exports occurred in 1998 as prompted by cholera outbreak in 
Kenya. Of particular concern is the fact the EU insisted on passing a second ban despite the 
risk analysis undertaken by the WTO and Food Aid Organisation (FAO). This risk analysis 
proved that the cholera outbreak would not pose any health threat to consumers.551 
                                                          
545 Ibid.  
546 Noor (note 25 above).8 
547 Ibid  
548 Gebrehiwet (note 493 above) 59 
549 One of the requirements that Kenya was unable to meet was the EU’s hazard analysis critical control points 
(HACCP) requirement. 
550 Henson & Loader (note 1 above) 93 
551 The Food Aid Organisation outlined that ‘epidemiological data suggests that the risk of transmission of 
cholera from contaminated imported fish is negligible…’  See FAO Press Release ‘Import ban on fish products 
from Africa not the most appropriate answer’ 1998/21 available at 
http://www.fao.org/waicent/ois/press_ne/presseng/1998/pren9821.htm  ACCESSED 28 OCTOBER 2014. This 
implies that the ban was arbitrary and disregarded the requirement of the SPS Agreement that SPS measures 
should not be maintained without sufficient scientific evidence-Article 2 (3) . In considering what constitutes an 
SPS measure it can be noted that it should be a measure aimed at protecting human and animal health and life 
and plant life- see Annex 1A. The EU ban seems to have overlooked this provision.  
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The significance of this finding is that the EU imposed an SPS related ban without a 
sufficient scientific basis as contemplated by the SPS Agreement.552 It can be argued that the 
ban could possibly affect Kenya’s market access into the EU. Moreso, the ban prompted the 
need for Kenya to comply with stringent regulations which posed compliance difficulties for 
Kenya due to its limited technical infrastructure.553 The third ban occurred in 1999 as a 
consequence of fish poisoning on Lake Victoria.554 The ban had an adverse impact of 
affecting approximately 40 000 artisan fishermen’s livelihoods.555 The further consequences 
of the three bans apart from being an obstacle to market access included grave costs to the 
Kenyan agricultural sector and trade diversion.556 The latter occurred as a consequence of the 
fact that upgrading infrastructure in order to comply with the EU requirements was 
exorbitantly high taking into account Kenya’s limited economic capacity.557 
Notwithstanding the serious illness that consuming such fish could cause, the bans in 
question seem to have been taken without regard to the disciplines of the SPS Agreement.558 
The SPS Agreement stipulates that any Member country applying SPS measures has to 
scientifically prove that the product in question poses a real threat to people’s, animal and 
plant health and/or life in the circumstances.559 The Agreement further imposes or requires 
that risk assessment be carried out based on guidelines developed by relevant international 
organizations where they exist.560 Furthermore, a reasonable opportunity has to be afforded to 
the exporter to put in place measures that eliminate health risk and a timeframe for 
compliance.561 It is also apparent from the EU African fish case that the ban was not based on 
scientific evidence but rather ‘the lack of a credible system in Kenya to protect the products 
                                                          
552 Art 2 (2) SPS Agreement 
553 Henson & Loader (note 1 above) 93 
554 EU decision 99/253/EC  
555 RO Abila ‘Food safety in food security and food trade case study: Kenyan fish exports’ (2003) available at 
http://www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/publications/focus10_08.pdf ACCESSED ON 28 OCTOBER 2014 
556 Gebrehiwet (note 493 above) 96   Also see NK Gitonga, L Okal  & E Mutegi  ‘The effects of the EU ban on 
Lake victoria fish exports on Kenyan fisheries’ (1998) available at 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/008/y9155b/y9155b0h.htm ACCESSED ON 28 OCTOBER 2014 
557S Henson & W Mitullah ‘Kenyan Exports of Nile Perch: The Impact of Food Safety Standards on an Export-
Oriented Supply Chain’ (2004) World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3349 29 
558C.U.T.S. ‘Perspectives from Kenya: Importance and effects of SPS and TBT on trade policy and trade 
relations’ (2012) CUTS 4 available at http://www.cuts-geneva.org/pacteac/eac-geneva-forum/209-importance-
and-effects-of-sps-and-tbt-measures-on-trade-policy-and-trade-relations.html ACCESSED ON 28 OCTOBER 
2014 
559 Art 2 SPS Agreement- necessity requirement 
560 Art 5 SPS Agreement- such strict impositions are meant to ensure that the application of SPS measure is not 
based on merely on conjecture but sufficient scientific evidence. 
561 Annex 2B of the SPS Agreement stipulates that ‘except in urgent circumstances, Members shall allow a 
reasonable interval between the publication of a sanitary or phytosanitary regulation and its entry into force in 
order to allow time for producers in exporting Members, and particularly in developing country Members, to 
adapt their products and methods of production to the requirements of the importing Member’. 
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from possible contamination’.562 The failure to comply by Kenya would be met by closure of 
EU market to the Kenyan fish exports.563 It can be argued that the bans in question had the 
undesirable effect of limiting Kenya’s market access to the EU in products that Kenya has a 
comparative advantage.564  
 
4.6 IMPLICATIONS OF CURRENT EU SPS MEASURES ON KENYAN MARKET 
ACCESS 
 
Ogambi A notes that meeting the EU SPS requirements is very challenging for agro-food 
exporters and this is aggravated by the multiplicity of requirements across different export 
markets.565 Despite the inclusion of special and differential (S&D) provisions in the SPS 
Agreement, inter alia affording developing countries extended timeframe for compliance;566 
developing countries still face difficulties in implementing the Agreement itself.567 The 
manner in which these standards are set and the process of challenging their legality poses 
enormous difficulties for a developing country like Kenya which lacks adequate technical or 
negotiating skills.568 In support of this assertion it can be argued that developing countries 
always lack bargaining power in such negotiations owing to their dependence on developed 
countries’ markets.569 One implication of this is that a developing country will be forced to 
comply with unjustifiable or arbitrary SPS measures for the sake of maintaining a healthy 
                                                          
562 JS Wilson ‘Standards, regulation and trade: WTO Rules and developing country concerns’ in BM Hoekman, 
P English & A Mattoo (eds) A Development, trade and the WTO: A handbook (2002) 428, 430 
563 From the EU Kenyan Fish case, inter alia, it can be identified that any limitation or restriction on Kenyan 
fish products’ export to EU would be arbitrary which is contrary to the commitments of the SPS Agreement. See 
SPS Agreement’s preamble and Article 2(3). Also see ibid 430 
564 The limitation of Kenya’s market access to the EU is particularly concerning considering the intimate trading 
relationship Kenya shares with the EU and more significantly the dependence of Kenyan exporters on the EU 
market.  Evidence suggests that the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) is Kenya’s 
key export market for manufactured goods whereas the EU is Kenya’s major export market for agricultural 
goods. It follows that the ban would restrictively hinder the market access in question. See Ogambi (note 474 
above) 13 
565 Ibid Also see CUTS (note 558 above) 2 
566 Art 10 SPS Agreement 
567 CUTS (note 558 above) 3 ACCESSED ON 28 OCTOBER 2014 Henson S and Loader R argue that the 
concerns in respect of the SPS Agreement are not directly attributable to the inherent flaws of the Agreement 
but the manner in which developed countries set and manage SPS measures- the refers to their formulation and 
implementation- see Henson & Loader (note 1 above) 91 
568See (note 564 above) 
569 The SA-EU Citrus situation advances a good case for the argument that developing countries have limited 
bargaining power in some instances due to their dependency on the EU market. For instance, the majority of 
EU’s citrus exports and other agricultural commodities are largely dependent upon the EU market. The same 
can be said of most ACP countries as the success of their exports hinges on the existence of a healthy trading 
relationship with the EU. 
82 
 
trading relationship with an offending developing country.570 Ogambi A further argues that 
the limitation of Kenyan market access based on the stringent EU regulations will result in a 
collapse in Kenyan export production and increased production cost (where EU regulations 
have to be strictly complied with).571 This has adverse economic backlashes. Other 
consequences entail higher risk of crop wastage especially amongst small scale farmers and 
producers in developing countries.572 
The increasingly strict EU rules on Minimum Residue Levels (MRLs)573 exist as a major 
impediment which limits holistic compliance with them.574 Whereas MRLs rules can benefit 
workers by affording them access to improved healthcare and acting as incentives for 
technology development they have proved to be a major impediment to Kenyan small scale 
farmers’ productivity.575 The minority of exporters that comply with the EU MRLs 
regulations do so with considerable strains that can gradually mutate into hindrances to 
market access due to ineffective compliance. The most difficult requirement in relation to the 
EU’s SPS’ measures on Kenyan exports to the EU is the traceability requirement.576 The 
processes involved in complying with the traceability requirement are usually costly which 
inhibits the Kenyan exporters’ capacity to comply with them.577 
In general NTBs such as SPS measures have affected Kenyan market access in respect of 
products such as fish (as shown above) and  also horticultural products namely cut flowers.578 
                                                          
570This is evident in the EU fish import bans on Kenya where Kenyan exporters had to upgrade their 
infrastructure in order to comply with the EU requirements. Also see Vecchiatto (note 529 above) where SA 
Citrus growers voluntarily ceased their citrus exports to EU due to fear of compromising the possibility of a 
permanent ban should they fail to meet the required EU CBS requirements. 
571 Ogambi (note 474 above) 13 
572 See ibid- small scale farmers usually face the full wrath of market access limitation since they cannot meet 
the complex technical requirements that exist as preconditions to successful exportation of their produce. 
573 The requirement of MRLs at analytical zero is notoriously strict and onerous since it requires that there be no 
trace of pesticide residue in agricultural products destined for the EU market. The major problem with this 
requirement is that the Kenyan climate requires use of pesticides and failure to apply pesticides is risky to the 
quality of the agricultural products. See Noor (note 25 above) 11 
574 CUTS (note 558 above) 4 
575 See (note 571 above) Small scale farmers usually face the full wrath of market access limitation since they 
cannot meet the complex technical requirements that exist as preconditions to successful exportation of their 
produce. Furthermore, the implementation of SPS agreement requires both financial and technical resources 
which Kenya lacks. 
576This requirement has the capacity to impact on the market access of Kenya into the EU in the following 
manner: refusal by distributors in the EU to obtain products from foreign importers who fail to guarantee the 
traceability and food safety of the consignment in question. Other challenges related to this requirement include 
the certification schemes and testing procedures which are mainly provided by foreign firms at exorbitant costs. 
Also see CUTS (note 558 above) 6 
577 According to World Bank Studies it was projected that 4000 to 5000 small scale producers in Kenya who 
account for 5% to 13 percent of the total export production are possible casualties of the EU strict rules. See 
World Bank Studies (2004) Growth and Competiveness in Kenya. 
578 CUTS (note 558 above) 4 
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This can be evidenced by the above EU ban on Kenyan fish imports in the 1990s and the 
perpetual protests by Kenya against the use of SPS measures by developed countries alleging 
that their use constitutes a disguised form of protectionism.579 The nature of EU’s SPS 
regulations on Kenyan exporters can be summed up by Kibicho K’s (Kenyan Foreign affairs 
principal secretary) complaint. He asserts that the ‘EU has repeatedly introduced SPS 
measures which constitute a handicap for Kenyan exporters’.580 Kenya’s problem is further 
aggravated by the rapid proliferation of private standards or private sector requirements 
which impose stricter conditions than those imposed by the EU’s public standards.581 The 
implications of private standards namely compliance with the Euro-Retailer Produce 
Working Group Good Agricultural Practices (EUREPGAP) requirements is that they require 
‘financial costs to the producer both on- and off-farm…’ and act as a prerequisite to 
successful exportation of citrus fruits for example.582 This is due to the fact that compliance 
with the EUREPGAP is a norm for citrus exports purchasers in the EU.583  
The paradox of private standards is that, though they are considered to be voluntary, they are 
‘essential for successful exportation which makes them de facto mandatory’.584 These 
standards thus, unjustifiably inhibit the market access of exporters who fail to comply with 
them.585 Moreover, private standards frequently impose additional costs of production which 
is particularly concerning considering ‘the differential impact of increasing private 
                                                          
579 Ibid 3 
580News24 ‘Kenya and EU to develop platform to enhance market access’ News24 08 May 2014 available at 
http://m.news24.com/kenya/Business/News/Kenya-EU-to-develop-platform-to-enhance-market-access-
20140508 ACCESSED ON 14 OCTOBER 2014 
581 Private standards or private sector requirements are defined as standards set by the private sector. These 
include the good agricultural practices set by the Euro-Retailer Produce Working Group (EUREP)/Global 
Partnership for Good Agricultural Practice (GlobalGAP) and the food safety management system standard ISO 
22000 from the International Organization for Standardization (ISO). It has been argued that these standards are 
essential since they complement the public standards’ which follow a slow process in their setting and 
implementation. See A Disdier, B Fekadu, C Murillo & SA Wong ‘Trade Effects of SPS and TBT Measures on 
Tropical and Diversification Products’ (2008) ICTSD Issue Paper No. 12 13. Also see CUTS (note 558 above) 
3-4 
582 Disdier et al (note 581 above) 14 
583Article 13 of the SPS Agreement stipulates that ‘Members are fully responsible under this Agreement for the 
observance of all obligations set forth herein… Members shall take such reasonable measures as may be 
available to them to ensure that non-governmental entities within their territories…comply with the relevant 
provisions of this Agreement’. However, the SPS Agreement apart from this stipulation does not provide what 
constitutes ‘reasonable measures’ and how Members can specifically ensure the ‘observance’ of the SPS 
Agreement’s stipulations.  
584 S Henson & J Northen ‘Economic Determinants of Food Safety Controls in the Supply Retailer Own-
Branded Products in the UK’ (1998) 14 Agribusiness 113–126. 
585 Cf. Disdier et al. (note 581 above) 15 Disdier. et. al argues that  ‘private standards could be trade enhancing 
since they assist producers to improve the quality of their products and provide access to new markets. This 
potential positive impact of standards on market access partly explains why producers in exporting countries try 
to fulfil them, despite the associated costs…’ However, this case is usually the exception and not the norm- see 
ibid 99 where Disdier. et. al argues that ‘…some standards are restrictive on market access, acting as NTBs’ 
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standards’.586 It has been argued by foreign exporters that private sector requirements lack 
transparency since they are not notified to the WTO and lack scientific bases as contemplated 
by the SPS Agreement.587 In extreme cases these private standards conflict with the public 
standards and can be more onerous than them.588  
4.7 CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF EU SPS REQUIREMENTS AND PROBLEMS FACED 
BY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
 
The SPS measures adopted by the EU against both South Africa and Kenya fail to subscribe 
to the key commitments of the WTO.589 Moreover, as alluded to above, according to Article 
2(2) of the WTO SPS Agreement members are required to ensure ‘that any sanitary or 
phytosanitary measure is applied only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or 
plant life or health is based on scientific principles and is not maintained without sufficient 
scientific evidence’. Moreso, in terms of Article 5 (4) of the SPS Agreement Member 
countries are encouraged to adopt the least trade distorting measures. Noor H argues it is self-
evident that the EU did not holistically engage with these provisions in their previous trade 
relations with Kenya.590 The same can be argued in light of the South African citrus cases. In 
relation to the horticultural and fishing sectors; Kenya faces difficulties in complying with the 
EU SPS requirements due to infrastructural constraints as well as lack of access to 
appropriate technical and scientific expertise.591 SA citrus exporters are currently facing 
compliance problems with the EU requirements which are costly to adhere to.592 It is 
submitted that these constraints adversely impact on Kenya and SA’s market access to a 
greater extent.  
                                                          
586 Ibid,15. 
587 Ibid 14 
588 This can be of particular concern considering that private sector standards private standards cover not only 
food safety but also other issues namely quality, production methods and environmental concerns which do not 
fall within the ambit of the SPS Agreement. This has the adverse effect of imposing additional burdens on 
developing countries’ exporters due to the multiplicity of requirements which may not necessarily be SPS 
related.  See 
www.unctad.org/trade_env/test1/meetings/wto1/Summary%20of%20SPS%20Committee%20Discussion%20on
%20Private%20Standards.pdf ACCESSED ON 29 OCTOBER 2014 
589 These include trade liberalization via the removal of all forms of trade barriers and transparency  
590 Noor (note 25 above) 8 
591 Noor (note 543 above) - This infrastructure includes, inter alia, building laboratories, processing plants and 
cooling facilities. 
592 The EU regulations on the SA citrus industry are likely to have adverse economic backlashes on the SA 
employment sector and livelihoods of about 100 000 farmworkers who are amongst the least paid in SA. In total 
is estimated that ‘more than a million households depend on the South African citrus industry for their 
livelihood’. D.A.F.F. ‘A profile of the South African citrus market value chain’ (2012) 15-16 available at 
http://www.nda.agric.za/docs/AMCP/Cmvp2012.pdf ACCESSED 21 NOVEMBER 2014 
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It should be noted that developed countries in giving priority to food safety over trade 
subsequently apply stricter SPS measures based on ‘risk’ assessment in comparison to those 
adopted by developing countries. Noor H argues that the setback in the use of risk assessment 
to adopt stricter SPS measures is that ‘risk’ assessment is ‘an inexact science and developing 
countries lack the technical, scientific and financial resources to challenge measures 
grounded on risk’.593 In this respect, Ronge E argues that standards can assume the status of 
prohibitive trade barriers when onerous requirements are imposed at the expense of normal 
procedures namely failure to initially undertake a comprehensive risk assessment.594 Apart 
from the costly conformity assessments related to SPS requirements the bureaucratic 
procedures involved in obtaining SPS approvals constitute a significant barrier to trade. The 
situation is further exacerbated by market segmentation which occurs ‘when developed 
countries maintain separate, albeit legitimate, measures to deal with same perceived risks’.595 
Another problem related to the developed countries’ SPS requirements is their 
incompatibility with the prevailing systems of production and marketing in developing 
countries.596 It can be argued that these are often adopted without taking into account the 
special needs and difficulties faced by developing countries in complying with these 
requirements.597 The problem is exacerbated by the lack of appropriate scientific expertise 
and infrastructure in developing countries coupled with little or no assistance from 
developing countries.598 Furthermore, the S&D provisions which might afford developing 
countries assistance from developing countries as contemplated by Article 10 of the SPS 
Agreement are limited in their application. This is because they are ‘best endeavour 
                                                          
593 Noor (note 543 above)  
594 Ronge (note 476 above) 26 
595 Ibid  
596Henson & Loader (note 1 above); Noor (note 543 above); Also see CUTS (note 558 above) 4- It can be 
argued that the incompatibility of SPS requirements of developed countries and developing countries’ 
production methods can result in extended times for compliance which affects production and exportation save 
in cases where developed countries accept different procedures as equivalent in terms of the level of SPS 
protection afforded. However, such exceptions are highly unlikely to occur.  
597 The SPS Agreement [Article 10 (1)] ‘encourages developing countries to take into account the special needs 
of developing countries’. It can be argued that the apparent insensitivity of developed countries in dealing with 
developing countries as far as standards are concerned, despite having been encouraged to do so by the SPS 
Agreement, supports the assertion that these measures are arbitrarily imposed thus constituting protectionist 
devices. This is despite the fact the SPS Agreement asks of states to consider this (special needs of developing 
countries) before introducing such measures and even calls for discussion between the states/parties before the 
measure is introduced. Also see CUTS (note 558 above) 3 
598 Article 9 of the SPS Agreement requires developing countries to render assistance to developing countries. 
However, the technical assistance prescribed in terms of the Agreement falls short of the ability to adequately 
deal with the prevalent problems faced by developing countries namely low levels of economic development. 
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provisions’, thus they lack the authority mandate developed countries to assist developing 
countries. 599  
The failure of developing countries to comply with the developed countries SPS measures 
have also been attributed to a number of factors. These include the argument that the 
participation of developing countries in international standard setting bodies is inadequate. It 
can be argued effective participation in standard setting requires adequate institutional 
infrastructure, human and financial resources yet most developing countries lack these.600 
Developing countries have also raised concerns in relation to the standard setting bodies 
alleging that these institutions fail to adequately take into account the special needs and 
circumstances of developing countries.601 Developing countries have also argued that the 
impact of SPS measures on market is adversely affected by the limited time afforded to 
developing countries between notification and implementation.602 Another problem which 
needs to be addressed is that of transparency in the implementation of SPS measures.603 It is 
argued that ‘though the notification system is supported in principle’, its arrangements do not 




This chapter outlined the manner in which the EU -SPS measures impeded and continue to 
impede market access for South Africa and Kenya. As a point of departure it was shown that 
market access serves an important role in the integration of developing countries into 
multilateral trading system. Moreover, it allows developing countries to yield the benefits of 
trade in agricultural goods which they have a comparative advantage in. However, the current 
developed countries’ SPS measures are heavily limiting developing countries’ economic 
gains from global trade due to their onerous nature. It was shown that developed countries 
apply SPS measures which are difficult for developing countries to comply with. This 
problem is prompted by developing countries’ limited infrastructural capacity and expertise 
                                                          
599 Noor (note 25 above) 12 
600 CUTS (note 558 above) 3-4 Infrastructural resources include laboratories for complying with SPS tests and 
human resources relates to technical experts. 
601 These standard setting bodies commonly known as the 3 sisters as contemplated Annex 3A (a) – (c) namely 
(Codex Alimentarius Commission, International Office of Epizootics and International Plant Protection 
Convention) were discussed in Chapter 3. 
602 Noor (note 25 above) 15;Also see Henson & Loader (note 1 above) 98  
603 CUTS (note 558 above) 4 ff 
604 WTO (1999) ‘SPS agreement and developing countries’ Submission by Egypt 
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and lack of requisite financial resources. Consequently, developing countries’ access to 
developed countries markets is adversely affected. 
The problem is particularly concerning due to the fact that developed countries are 
increasingly implementing SPS measures without regard to the disciplines of the SPS 
Agreement. As discussed, the ability of developing countries to challenge these SPS 
measures is often hindered by their lack of scientific expertise and financial resources. The 
current nature of the S&D provisions and the technical assistance provisions of the SPS 
Agreement cannot afford developing countries any justice as they are not mandatory. This is 
further exacerbated by the insensitivity of developing countries’ special needs and 
circumstances in developed countries’ SPS standards setting. All these problems, inter alia, 

















CHAPTER 5:  
 




Studies suggest that technical measures in general, are the most significant impediment to 
exports.605 The EU has been dubbed to be the leading group of developed countries in the use 
of technical standards.606 As identified and discussed in the preceding chapters, SPS measures 
are ‘increasingly becoming a major stumbling block in agricultural trade for developing 
countries’.607 This poses serious market access problems for developing countries which have 
a comparative advantage in agricultural products which are the mainstay of most developing 
countries’ economies. This chapter will outline the findings of this thesis particularly in 
respect to the difficulties faced by developing countries in complying with developed 
countries’ SPS standards. Furthermore, this chapter will proffer recommendations for 
purposes of remedying the problems and difficulties contemplated in the findings and the 
thesis at large. 
5.2 FINDINGS 
 
There are a number of problems that developing countries face in the attempt to access 
developing countries’ markets. The formulation and implementation of SPS measures by 
developed countries forms the core of the problem of limited market access. This is due to the 
fact that SPS requirements adopted by developed countries are usually costly and difficult for 
developing countries to comply with. The problem of non-compliance with such 
requirements has spill-over effects on developing countries’ ability to penetrate developed 
countries’ markets and/or maintain their position in those markets. Such a problem is made 
more apparent by developing countries lack of adequate infrastructure, financial resources 
and technical expertise to comply with the developed countries’ SPS requirements. Even 
more, in circumstances where compliance is adhered to, the timeframe for compliance is 
often unreasonable thus, making it difficult for developing countries to meet the requirements 
within the prescribed time. 
                                                          
605Henson & Loader (note 1 above) 91 
606 This can be attributed to its technical requirements which are ‘process based controls enforced by a 
competent authority in exporting countries’. Such requirements are considered to be very onerous. See ibid 
607 Gebrehiwet et al (note 492 above) 23 
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The problem becomes particularly acute considering the proliferation in the arbitrary and 
unjustified use of SPS regulations as protectionist tools by developed countries. Developing 
countries on the contrary lack the requisite technical infrastructure and scientific insight to 
challenge the basis of these standards. Moreover, developing countries have indicated a 
tendency of merely attempting to comply with the imposed standards, albeit legitimate, for 
the sake of maintaining a share in the foreign markets.608 Such infrastructural and diplomatic 
constraints (lack of bargaining power) adversely impact on the developing countries’ market 
access into developed countries. Furthermore, the SPS requirements that are adopted and 
applied by developed countries usually conflict with the prevailing production and/or 
marketing systems in developing countries.609 It was also noted that the increasing 
proliferation of private standards poses a major threat and difficulty to developing countries’ 
market access. This problem is attributable to the fact that the SPS agreement is not explicit 
on the relationship between private standards schemes and the SPS Agreement. The problem 
with this situation is the prevailing uncertainty regarding whether the ambit of the SPS 
Agreement extends to private sector standards.610  
The leeway of SPS standard setting is also an issue of concern owing to the amount of 
discretion given by the SPS Agreement to Member countries in formulating SPS measures. 
All that is required is for a Member country to base its measures on science and not to 
maintain them without sufficient scientific evidence with the exception of the precautionary 
rule principle.611 The impact of SPS measures on developing countries market access to 
developed countries is exacerbated by the fact that there is unwillingness on the part of 
developed countries to accept measures in developing countries as equivalent. On the 





                                                          
608 See (note 569 above) 
609Henson & Loader (note 1 above) 93; Noor (note 543 above); Also see CUTS (note 558 above) 4 ACCESSED 
ON 29 OCTOBER 2014 
610Disdier et al. (note 581 above) 99 
611Art 2 (1) SPS Agreement & see Article 5 (7) for the precautionary rule principle. 
612See (note 604 above ) 
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5.3 RECOMENDATIONS  
 
5.3.1 Promotion of Harmonization and Transparency 
Since developing countries ‘implement qualitatively and/or quantitatively lower SPS 
standards’613 than developed countries; the SPS Agreement should in principle, bridge this 
lacuna. It can achieve this by improving transparency, promoting harmonization and 
preventing the implementation of SPS measures which lack adequate scientific 
justification.614 Much of this however, depends on the ability of developing countries to 
effectively participate in the implementation of the Agreement namely: standard setting 
processes. In support of this recommendation Henson L and Loader R assert that developing 
countries will only actualize the potential benefits of the Agreement if they are willing and 
able to participate in the institutions it establishes.615 However, it should be noted that 
whereas willingness to participate may be present, ability to do so is often the problem. Thus, 
it is argued that participation goes beyond simply affording developing countries an 
opportunity to participate in the SPS Agreement-established institutions. The participation 
should be effective and where necessary developing countries should be supported to 
actualize it.  
5.3.2 Encouraging Effective Participation  
Effective participation hinges upon the following key areas: representation in the WTO and 
its related institutions namely the SPS committees and international standards organisations; 
effective participation in activities associated with the SPS Agreement and institutional 
capacity in developing countries in order to implement effective SPS controls and to comply 
with commitments under the SPS Agreement.616 In dealing with the problem related to the 
operation and implementation of the SPS Agreement by developed countries it is 
recommended to conduct a review of the SPS Agreement’s operation and its implementation 
as stipulated by Article 12 (7) of the SPS Agreement.617 The proposed recommendations can 
                                                          
613 Henson & Loader (note 1 above) 93-94 
614 Though the SPS Agreement specifically provides for the regulation of these contemplated areas there is 
uncertainty pertaining to these areas resulting in the weak implementation thereof. 
615 Henson & Loader (note 1 above) 96 
616 Ibid- ‘Studies suggest that developing countries do not notify the SPS Committee on a routine basis on new 
measures that do not conform to international standards’ as contemplated by Annex 5B of the Agreement. This 
is a clear marker to the fact that developing countries are not effectively participating in the SPS Agreement and 
its implementation. One possible danger of this limited participation in the Agreement and its institutions will 
tend to be driven by developed countries’ priorities and standards. It can be further argued that in extreme cases 
it will culminate in the exploitation of the disciplines of the SPS Agreement by developed countries.  
617 However, it should be noted that this thesis is cognisant of the fact that the  review of the Agreement’s 
operation and implementation might also prompt the need to review SPS Agreement related WTO Agreements 
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be effected via the instrument of Article 12 (7) of the SPS Agreement which requires the SPS 
committee to ‘review the operation and implementation of the SPS Agreement….as the need 
arises’. The stipulation extends to the submission of proposals by the SPS Committee to the 
Council for Trade in Goods seeking amendment of the Agreement’s text where 
appropriate.618  
5.3.3 Review and revision of harmonization and equivalence provisions 
It is recommended that the review in question be undertaken in the manner outlined 
subsequently. Firstly, it is recommended that Article 3 (harmonization provision) should be 
revised to the extent that international standards will be developed in a manner that takes into 
consideration the special needs and circumstances of developing countries on a consensual 
basis.619 This will be complemented by the recommendation outlined earlier namely affording 
developing countries effective participation in the standard setting bodies. Such an approach 
will enhance the capacity of developing countries to comply with the general SPS 
requirements which have their basis on international standards. Consequently, it is suggested 
that this will improve developing countries’ market access which is often impeded by failure 
to comply with developed countries’ SPS requirements. The SPS committee could develop a 
set of rules that the bodies responsible for standard setting will be mandated to adhere to in 
the standard setting processes.620 Whereas it appreciated that such a reform will limit state 
sovereignty,621 it is argued that the recommended reform is important for purposes of 
ensuring uniformity in the multilateral trading system. 
Secondly, in dealing with the arbitrary nature of SPS requirements it is recommended that 
Member countries adopt less restrictive SPS measures as contemplated by the SPS 
Agreement. This can be achieved by revisiting the provision on equivalence, Article 4. The 
problem lies with the interpretation of equivalence as sameness which Zarrilli S argues to 
have the adverse effect of depriving Article 4 (1) of its function.622 The provision could also 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
namely the TBT Agreement and the AoA. It is inevitable that the latter agreements will also be affected if such a 
review is conducted. 
618 Article 12 (7) SPS Agreement  
619 Zarrilli (note 345 above) 21 
620 Ibid  
621 The SPS Agreement to some extent hinges on Member Countries’ sovereignty via the vehicle of Article 2 (1) 
‘Members have the right to take SPS measures necessary for the protection of human, animal or plant life or 
health…’ subject to some limitations stipulated therein.  
622 The proper function of Article 4 (1) is to ‘recognize that different measures may achieve the same level of 
protection’ thus affording countries to adopt equivalent SPS measures to the extent that they can achieve the 
same level of protection sought by the importing Member country. Dismantling rigidity in this respect will 
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specifically encompass the use of mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) on conformity 
assessments which are currently outside the ambit of the SPS Agreement.623 Other 
alternatives namely Good Hygiene Practices (GHP) could be used in cases where agricultural 
products in question do not pose an imminent threat to human and animal health and/or life or 
plant life.624  
The recommendations in respect of equivalence and harmonization will be significant in the 
creation of transparent and uniform standards across developed countries. This will 
effectively address the problem faced by developing countries in complying with the 
multiplicity of SPS requirements imposed by different developed countries in respect of same 
sanitary and phytosanitary threats. This problem is known as market segmentation and occurs 
when developed countries maintain separate, albeit legitimate, SPS measures to deal with 
same perceived risks.625 This can be corrected by lobbying for uniform SPS standards by 
developed countries where conditions permit.626 In dealing with the problem of private 
standards which pose a major threat and difficulty to developing countries’ market access the 
SPS committee ought to clarify the relationship between private standards schemes and the 
SPS Agreement. The determination of whether private standards fall within the ambit of the 
SPS Agreement will assist in the effective regulation of such standards. The importance of 
creating certainty in the area of private standards is that it will also enhance transparency and 
uniformity in the implementation of these standards. 
5.3.4 Increased and effective use of bilateral trade forums 
It is also recommended that developing countries should make effective use of bilateral 
agreements to negotiate on recognition of different SPS measures as contemplated by Article 
4 (2) of the SPS Agreement.627 It has been argued that countries enter into Regional Trade 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
enhance the capacity of developing countries to comply with the imposed SPS requirements using available 
resources. See (note 619 above) 25 
623 MRAs on conformity assessments have the capacity to improve market access for developing countries by 
avoiding repetitive testing which usually increase the costs of compliance thus hindering market access. 
Currently, the SPS Agreement via the vehicle of Article 4 only recognises MRAs that deal with equivalence on 
SPS measures. 
624 Noor (note 25 above) 9 
625 Ronge (note 476 above) 26 
626 This preserves Member countries’ sovereignty to some extent as argued earlier- see (note 621 above) 
627 Article 4 (2) of the SPS Agreement stipulates that ‘Members shall, upon request, enter into consultations with 
the aim of achieving bilateral and multilateral agreements on recognition of the equivalence of specified SPS 
measures’. There is need for developing country governments to engage more in these discussions so as to 
effectively yield the benefits of the SPS Agreement.  
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Agreements (RTAs) in order to ensure continued access to a certain country markets.628 
Furthermore, ‘RTAs can also increase the bargaining power of an RTA’s constituent 
members within multilateral arrangements’629 namely the SPS Agreement and RTAs have 
been dubbed to be important in speeding up the dismantling of tariffs namely NTBs. It 
follows that NTBs are easier to dismantle within the context of RTAs as opposed to the WTO 
multilateral framework.630 On the weight of the assertions highlighted above, developing 
countries could seek to join RTAs so as to secure continued market access into developed 
country markets, thus increasing their bargaining power in effectively dealing with the 
adverse impact of SPS measures. These bilateral treaties could assume the form of Economic 
Partnership Agreements (EPAs)631 such as the recent SA-EU Economic Partnerships 
Agreement.632  
There is no evidence to support that RTAs have been effectively used to deal with the 
problem of SPS measures in the EU-SA Trade and Development Cooperation Agreement 
(TDCA).633 Stoler A however argues that despite the avowed commitment to deal with SPS 
and TBT measures within the framework of the TDCA, the agreement is ‘less ambitious in 
those areas in comparison with other RTAs signed by the EU namely the EU-Chile 
Association Agreement’.634 To evidence this, SPS measures are only referred to in the 
general provisions on agriculture namely Article 61635 within the provision on economic 
                                                          
628 C Picker ‘Regional Trade Agreements v. the WTO: A proposal for reform of Article XXIV to counter this 
institutional threat’ (2005) 275 available at 
https://www.law.upenn.edu/journals/jil/articles/volume26/issue2/Picker26U.Pa.J.Int'lEcon.L.267(2005).pdf 
ACCESSED ON 31 OCTOBER 2014 
629The chances of securing this bargaining are however argued to be less common.  
See World Bank, Trade Blocs. ‘A World Bank Policy Report’ (2000) 17-21 Available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETTRADE/Resources/2390541187893756753/wdItable6_6_2008.pd
f ACCESSED ON 31 OCTOBER 2014  
630 Picker (note 628 above) 276 
631 Since, the WTO is persisting on the formation of these EPAs; this provides a lucrative opportunity for 
developing countries to use that domain to deal with non-tariff barriers. 
632 L Ensor ‘SA neighbours in new farm deal with EU’ Bdlive 21 July 2014 available at 
http://www.bdlive.co.za/business/agriculture/2014/07/21/sa-neighbours-in-new-farm-deal-with-eu ACCESSED 
ON 27 OCTOBER 2014   
633 Under the TDCA, inter alia, the parties thereof vow to ‘cooperate on the development of MRAs on 
conformity assessments in areas of mutual economic interest as well as the area of quality management and 
assurance in selected sectors of importance to SA. More importantly, the facilitation of technical assistance for 
Southern African capacity building initiatives in the fields of accreditation amongst others and in particular the 
development of practical links between SA and EU standardization, certification and accreditation 
organizations’. See Official Journal of the European Communities, L 311/18, December 12, 1999. 
634 A Stoler ‘TBT and SPS measures in practice’ (2012) L331/18 Journal of the EU 217, 223 
635 Article 61 (1) (e) of the TDCA stipulates that ‘co-operation in this area (Agriculture) shall be aimed at the 
promotion of integrated, harmonious and sustainable rural development in South Africa. Cooperation will in 
particular be geared …to examine measures to harmonise standards and rules on animal and plant health, with a 
view to facilitating trade, taking into account the legislation in force for both Parties and in conformity with the 
rules of the WTO’. 
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cooperation. More alarming is the fact that ‘there is no ready evidence on the extent to which 
the implementation of SPS provisions has been achieved’.636 It is recommended that SA and 
the EU should consider a reorientation and possible revision of the TDCA in respect of the 
economic cooperation text.637 This can be achieved by extending to other areas particularly 
that of SPS measures. The underlying reason for this dealing with SPS matters will enhance 
trade cooperation.638 It also recommended that if Kenya ratifies an EPA with EU it should 
also substantially house provisions on SPS matters. Under both EPAs it is further 
recommended that both bilateral agreements should ‘incorporate technical assistance and 
capacity building measures to assist the exporters of the developing-country partner’.639 
These bilateral forums would also be crucial in dealing with the problem of complying with 
private standards of producers in the EU.  
5.3.5 Review of Article 6 of the SPS Agreement 
Article 6 of the SPS Agreement which pertains to adaption to regional conditions is another 
provision that requires review. One of the concerns raised by developing countries in light of 
Article 6 is that the full benefits of regionalization, as contemplated in the provision, are not 
being realized due to the difficulties in implementing this provision.640 The process of 
proving that some areas are pest and/or disease free is time consuming and complex. As such 
the process can be onerous since it requires scientific and infrastructural support which is 
usually lacking in developing countries. In light of these problems it is recommended that this 
provision should explicitly make reference to the effect that ‘scientific and administrative 
support shall be provided by international organizations and developed countries to 
developed countries to facilitate implementation of the Article 6 provisions’.641  
 
 
                                                          
636 According to the European Commission  ‘as regards the provisions that have not been implemented yet, there 
seems to be a strong interest in deepening cooperation in the following areas: trade and related-trade areas, 
intellectual property rights, customs, competition policy, regional policy, sanitary and phytosanitary measures 
(emphasis intended), technical barriers to trade…’ see European Commission. (2006) ‘Toward an EU-South 
Africa Strategic Partnership’ available at http://eurlex.europa.eu ACCESSED ON 22 NOVEMBER 2014 
637 Ibid.  
638 Ibid  
639 Stoler (note 634 above) 231 – ‘If technical regulations and conformity assessment procedures cannot be 
harmonized, it is important for the purposes of the PTA that the parties work to eliminate duplicate or multiple 
measures or mandatory tests for the same product. This is particularly crucial for small and medium-size 
enterprises that cannot afford the high cost of meeting differing regulations and testing regimes. Mutual 
recognition agreements are important tools in this respect’.  
640Bossche et al (note 356 above) 65 
641 see Zarrilli (note 345 above) 25 
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5.3.6 Revision and clarification of notification timeframes 
In respect of the concern that market access of developing countries is adversely affected by 
the limited time afforded to developing countries between notification and implementation of 
SPS measures, it is recommended that adequate time be afforded to the developing countries. 
In giving effect to this recommendation the meaning of ‘reasonable interval’, as contemplated 
by Annex 2B of the SPS Agreement, should be clarified.642 Alternatively the Agreement 
should specifically stipulate that the timeframe between notification and implementation 
should be determined relatively, taking into consideration special needs and circumstances of 
developing countries. It would be more rational to afford developing countries more time to 
comply with the SPS requirements given their limited infrastructural capacity and lack of 
requisite expertise.  
The solution contemplated above will also positively impact on the concerns related to 
transparency643 in developed countries SPS requirements and the differences that exist 
between developed countries SPS requirements and production methods prevalent in 
developing countries. In relation to the latter, an extended period of time for compliance 
would also allow capacity building in developing countries. However, as noted in this thesis 
inasmuch as developing countries are willing to comply with developed countries SPS 
requirements they are hindered by lack of infrastructural and financial resources. As such 
affording them an extended time frame for compliance with SPS requirements is not a 
panacea to the problem of limited market access. More needs to be done. 
5.3.7 Implementation of effective technical assistance 
In lieu of the finding outlined above it is recommended that developing countries be afforded 
effective technical assistance (as will be outlined shortly) to enhance their compliance with 
developed countries’ SPS requirements. This entails making technical cooperation in terms of 
                                                          
642 Annex 2B of the SPS Agreement stipulates that ‘with the exception of urgent circumstances, Members shall 
allow a reasonable interval between the publication and SPS regulation and its entry into force in order to afford 
producers in exporting Member Countries (particularly developing Member countries) to adapt their products 
and methods of production to the stipulated requirements of the importing Member country’. 
643 In relation to the problem of transparency in respect of developed countries SPS requirements related 
concerns could be resolved if ‘Member countries comprehensively applied the recommended procedures laid 
down by the SPS Committee’. See Henson & Loader (note 1 above) 99.With the advent of technology 
notification and access to new SPS requirements could be enhanced by exploiting electronic transmission 
means. Whereas Zarrilli S argues that the exploitation of such methods can be hampered by lack or limited 
access to the internet such an assertion is no longer relevant taking into consideration the improved access of 
developing countries to internet resources. However, where such access is limited the problem can be alleviated 
by the mandating developed countries to introduce such resources via technology transfer for instance. This 
recommendation is in line with the recommendation that technical assistance should be an integral part of 
capacity and not ‘reactionary’. Also see Zarrilli (note 345 above) 21 
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Article 9 of the SPS Agreement mandatory. Currently, the technical cooperation provision of 
the SPS Agreement is canvassed in voluntary terms ‘which have not been converted into 
specific obligations’.644 If technical cooperation is to be made mandatory by the Agreement it 
would deter developed countries from arbitrarily adopting SPS measures since they would be 
obliged to share the burden of infrastructural capacity building and the costs of ensuring 
compliance with their imposed SPS requirements.  
It is further recommended that technical assistance should be largely in the form scientific 
infrastructure and expertise since science is considered as the ‘touchstone against which SPS 
measures must be judged’.645 It should also be noted that technical assistance is currently 
reactionary as opposed to a stand-alone strategy of capacity building. It is considered to be 
reactionary because it is only provided once compliance problems have been identified. In 
order to effectively deal with this setback it is recommended that where developed countries 
contemplate setting up SPS requirements, capacity assessment followed by capacity building 
should be undertaken. For example transfer of technology could be undertaken by developed 
countries to achieve this.  
5.3.8 Adoption of Aid for Development (AFD) 
It is submitted that whereas the Doha Development Agenda and the Bali Round have made 
some significant strides in pursuing the Aid for Trade (AFT) initiative646 this development 
should not be taken as a substitute for mandatory technical cooperation contemplated above. 
It is thus, recommended that the WTO current Bali Round adopt a counterpart of AFT known 
as Aid for Development initiative (AFD).647 This initiative would be specifically dedicated 
towards technical and infrastructural development in developing countries and LDCs in order 
catalyse the capacity of developing countries to comply with SPS requirements. It is 
submitted that this initiative will complement the Bali- WTO Agreement on Trade 
                                                          
644 See Ibid, 23-The same situation applies to the nature of S & D provisions in terms of Article 10. 
645 Bossche et al (note 356 above) 35; Also see Zarrilli (note 345 above) 26  
646 The WTO-led Aid for Trade initiative ‘encourages developing country governments and donors to recognize 
the role that trade can play in development. In particular, the initiative seeks to mobilize resources to address the 
trade-related constraints identified by developing and least-developed countries’. See World Trade Organisation 
‘Aid for Trade’ available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/a4t_e/aid4trade_e.htm ACCESSED 
ON 21 OCTOBER 2014. 
647 I would like to acknowledge my supervisor C. Stevens (LLB, LLM,LLD Candidate UKZN) for the 
proposition of the idea of Aid for development (AfD) which focuses on infrastructural and capacity building 
inter alia in developing countries and LDCs. 
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Facilitation ‘which contains provisions that deal, inter alia, with assistance for capacity 
building’.648 
5.3.9 Revision of Article 10 
Another recommendation relating to the nature of the Agreement is Article 10, which deals 
with special and differential treatment. The problem of the current S&D provisions is that 
they have not been converted into specific obligations.649 To this extent, as outlined earlier,    
S & D provisions are ‘best endeavour provisions’ with no binding effect, thus they lack the 
authority to mandate developed countries to assist developing countries.650 As such 
developing countries still face the problem of compliance with SPS requirements due to 
infrastructural and financial constraints. In dealing with this problem it is recommended that 
the S&D provisions be converted into specific obligations particularly in circumstances 
where developed countries have imposed onerous SPS requirements. 
5.3.10 Encouraging a collaborative approach 
In effecting the recommendations stipulated above it is further recommended that the 
problems related to the impact of SPS measures on market access can be effectively dealt 
with via a collaborated effort. This would involve both developing and developed countries 
as well as other private stakeholders. Such an approach will ensure a certain level of 
uniformity in the SPS requirements which could potentially improve (in this respect) market 
access for especially developing countries. This thesis is cognisant of the fact that the SPS 
Agreement is merely one of the areas of concern in the MTS and the implementation of these 
recommendations in respect of the concerns thereof is thus merely a starting point in dealing 
with the problems faced by developing countries. 
5.4 CONCLUSION 
 
Whilst there has been a determined effort to regulate the trade restrictive effects of SPS 
measures by promulgating the SPS Agreement under the auspices of the WTO, developing 
countries still struggle with market access. Moreover, it was noted that developing countries 
lack the requisite infrastructural and technical resources to effectively exploit the 
opportunities offered by the Agreement. This has gradually been hampered by the increasing 
use of stringent SPS measures by developed countries with the adverse effect of excluding 
                                                          
648 Bali 9th Ministerial Conference 2013 Ministerial Decision on Aid for Trade (WT/COMTD/AFT/W/51) 
649 Noor (note 25 above) 11 
650 Ibid, 12. 
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developing countries’ agricultural exports from the latter’s market. The impact of SPS 
measures on market access of developing countries has been shown to be adverse to the 
agricultural sector which is the mainstay of most developing countries’ economies. The 
backlashes of this occurrence are apparent in, inter alia, increased costs of compliance with 
onerous SPS requirements, a decrease in productivity in the agricultural sector and potential 
loss of employment due to exclusion of agricultural products from foreign markets.  
The incompatibility of SPS requirements and production methods prevalent in developing 
countries has been identified as one of the major setback prompting the declining access to 
developed country markets. There are strong grounds to argue that the adverse impact of SPS 
measures on developing countries access into developed countries markets are related to the 
manner in which the SPS Agreement operates and the manner in which it is implemented by 
developed countries. These problems areas span from the insensitivity of developed countries 
to developing countries’ special needs and circumstances in setting their SPS requirements to 
the limited timeframes afforded for compliance with these requirements. The problem of 
market access can be remedied along these outlined fault lines. 
The problem of market access as prompted by onerous SPS requirements can be addressed in 
the following respects inter alia. Firstly, the SPS Agreement should be reviewed in light of 
the difficulties that developing countries encounter in implementing the Agreement. This 
review should be undertaken in respect of the problems outlined in the recommendations. 
Secondly, the review of the highlighted provisions ought to be dealt with by the unified effort 
of both developing and developed countries as well as other relevant stakeholders. This 
would ensure effective participation which is an important determinant in developing 
countries’ market access. Lastly, in setting and implementing SPS requirements developed 
countries ought to choose the least trade restrictive measures without necessarily 
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